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ABSTRACT 
The Role of Inflation in Soviet History:  
Prices, Living Standards, and Political Change 
by 
Steven M. Efremov 
 
This thesis discusses the interaction between inflation, living standards, and political change in 
Soviet/Russian history.  It traces the establishment and evolution of the Soviet monetary system, 
inflationary episodes, and their consequences.  
The goal of this study is to show how inflation affects the lives of ordinary people and how it has 
contributed to larger changes in Soviet history.  Sources include economic statistics and analysis 
from articles and monographs, as well as first-hand accounts from interviews and newspapers. 
The results show that inflation was a factor in both the rise and the fall of the Soviet Union.  
Russia‟s first hyperinflation (1917-1923) nearly destroyed the economy, and the Bolsheviks were 
forced to stabilize prices.  The Soviet system of price controls prevented inflation, but it also 
created persistent shortages of food and consumer goods.  Mikhail Gorbachev tried to alleviate 
these problems, but his efforts resulted instead in Russia‟s second hyperinflation (1992-1993). 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Price changes, or the lack thereof, were an important factor in determining living 
standards and influencing politics throughout the history of the Soviet Union and 20th century 
Russia.  In fact, the Soviet Union was both founded and dissolved in the midst of high inflation.  
The Bolsheviks took over after high food prices helped bring down the previous governments.  
However, their initial policies led to Russia‟s first hyperinflation, widespread suffering, and 
domestic unrest, so they had to stabilize the ruble and the economy in order to remain in power.  
After Stalin took charge, the Soviet economy struggled with inflation for two decades, until a 
currency reform in 1947 finally established a stable monetary system based on fixed prices.  
Although price controls prevented inflation, they also created persistent shortages of food and 
consumer goods, which were the most common complaints about the economy by Soviet 
citizens.  Finally, Gorbachev‟s efforts to save the Soviet economy from shortages and stagnation 
resulted instead in another hyperinflation and the Union‟s collapse.  The inflation and chaos of 
the early 1990s has made Russians skeptical of democracy and free markets, and voters have 
repeatedly chosen stability at the expense of political and economic freedom. 
Inflation first started in the Russian Empire during the First World War and led to higher 
food prices in the cities, which were major factor in creating urban discontent and bringing down 
both the imperial and provisional governments.  However, when the Bolsheviks took over, they 
made living conditions even worse by trying to create a moneyless economy.  This attempt, 
known as war communism, created hyperinflation, a major famine, shortages of goods, and 
rebellions by peasants and sailors.  The Bolsheviks were forced to establish a stable currency and 
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allow some market activity in order to keep from being overthrown like the two governments 
before them.  They managed to stabilize the ruble by balancing their budget and backing the 
currency with gold.  The economy made an astounding recovery in the 1920s under the New 
Economic Policy, but industrial prices rose much faster than agricultural prices on the open 
market.  The Bolshevik leaders responded by crowding out private merchants and re-imposing 
price controls.  They also continued to purchase grain from the peasants at artificially low rates, 
which made them reluctant to sell.  These factors inspired the decision to proceed with full-scale 
state industrialization and collectivization. 
During the Stalin years, the Russian economy had different types of stores with varying 
degrees of price controls and inflation.  Strict price controls were in place in most state stores and 
co-operatives, while others were allowed to sell at higher regulated rates.  While these stores had 
low prices, they also had shortages and a poor selection of products.  In contrast, collective farm 
markets were completely free to set their prices according to market forces, but their prices were 
usually much higher.  During the Second World War, the government started running budget 
deficits and printing too much money again, leading to even higher inflation.  State stores and 
co-operatives remained under price control and had relatively moderate inflation, but the 
collective farm markets had price increases that bordered on hyperinflation.  Inflation began to 
decline in 1944, after the Soviet government balanced its budget, and was eliminated completely 
after a currency reform in 1947. 
The peculiar monetary system of the Soviet Union managed to avoid open inflation for 
most of the post-Stalin era, but that does not mean inflationary pressures did not exist before 
Gorbachev‟s time.  Consumer prices remained stable for many decades because they were fixed 
and subsidized by political authorities and did not reflect supply and demand.   Yet despite their 
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best efforts, the authorities could not quash the effects of market forces completely.  While retail 
prices remained virtually unchanged, workers‟ wages continued to climb over the years.  This 
created what is known as repressed inflation, which can be defined as rising excess demand that 
leads to excess liquid assets in the hands of the population instead of higher prices.1  As a result, 
consumers constantly faced shortages, because production was responsive only to government 
plans, and growing demand did not lead to higher supply.  
The system of price controls had deleterious effects both for Soviet consumers and for the 
economy as a whole.  Decades of neglect left Soviet citizens with much lower incomes and 
living standards than people had in the West.  Shortages of most foods led to lower quality diets, 
and many consumer products that were routines available in the West, such as telephones, cars, 
and modern washing machines were amazingly rare in the Soviet Union.  Living conditions were 
less comfortable in many ways, with less housing space per person, no central heating, no air 
conditioning, and often no sewer connections or hot water.  When consumers could not find 
anything they wanted to buy, many chose to save a portion of their income every year.  This 
effect was cumulative over the years, as unsatisfied demand from each year was carried over to 
the next and the population‟s savings continued to grow.  By 1985, the Soviet economy had 
amassed a large monetary overhang, as the money supply had grown to become many times 
larger than what was needed for regular circulation.  While these problems had been building 
prior to 1985, the economic situation rapidly deteriorated during the Gorbachev years. 
The last Soviet leader knew that the economy needed to be reformed, but his efforts only 
aggravated its existing problems.  Workers‟ wages went up more than ever, but the supply of 
consumer goods remained too low, and prices remained fixed.  Government budget deficits grew 
to unsustainable levels and had to be financed by simply printing more money to cover the 
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shortfalls.  These new monetary emissions further contributed to the existing overhang, and the 
money supply became dangerously excessive.  In late 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed without 
solving the economic problems it had created and left its successor states to deal with the 
aftermath.  When Russia and the other newly independent republics finally freed most prices 
from controls in 1992, inflation for the year reached quadruple digits.  The economic and social 
effects were devastating.  Production broke down and shortages initially worsened, making food 
and other basic necessities even more difficult to find.  People‟s savings, which they had often 
been building for years, were wiped out.  Russia‟s GDP dropped by at least one-third in four 
years, and real incomes dropped for all but the wealthiest segment of society.  The hyperinflation 
of the 1990s has discredited free markets and democracy in the eyes of many Russians and led to 
them to desire stability at all costs, even if it is brought by an authoritarian leader.2 
 
 
                                                                 
1 D. M. Nuti, “Hidden and Repressed Inflation in Soviet-type Economies: Definitions, Measurements, and 
Stabilisation,” Contributions to Political Economy, Vol. 5, No. 1, (1986): 46. 
2 Stefan Hedlund and Niclas Sundström, “The Russian Economy after Systemic Change,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 
48, No. 6 (Sep., 1996): 889, 893, http://www.jstor.org/stable/152632 (accessed on November 2, 2010); Mark 
Harrison, “Coercion, Compliance, and the Collapse of the Soviet Command Economy,” The Economic History 
Review, New Series, Vol. 55, No. 3 (Aug. 2002): 398, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3091673 (accessed on 
November 11, 2010). 
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CHAPTER 2 
RUSSIA‟S FIRST HYPERINFLATION 
 
Like many other countries, Russia and the Soviet Union suffered from hyperinflation 
following the First World War.  In fact, most of Central and Eastern Europe was engulfed in 
hyperinflation between 1919 and 1924, including Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Poland, so 
Russia was hardly unique in that regard.  The causes of these inflations are easily identifiable and 
were largely due to the aftermath of The Great War and subsequent economic policies.  With few 
exceptions, all of the countries were facing the consequences of excessive wartime spending, 
large government budget deficits, physical destruction, output collapse, territorial and population 
loss.  As a result of the economic and budgetary problems, the governments of these countries 
resorted to issuing ever-increasing amounts of unbacked paper money to finance their 
expenditures.  Invariably, these policies caused hyperinflation and economic chaos. Russia‟s case 
followed all of these patterns except for one major difference.  In 1919, the Bolsheviks started 
trying to intentionally abolish money and establish a centrally planned economy based on in-kind 
distribution.  It was this specific decision, based on their ideology, that created hyperinflation 
and almost completely destroyed the Russian economy.  Nevertheless, the ruble was stabilized 
virtually the same way as all the other currencies that were devalued around the same time.1  Due 
to a collapse in output and growing unrest, the Bolsheviks were forced to admit that allocating 
resources without the use of money was impossible, so they balanced their budget, issued a gold-
backed ruble, and partially legalized private trade. 
Background 
The background to Russia‟s first hyperinflation shared many similarities with the 
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contemporary ones of its neighbors.  Prior to the war, the ruble had 98 percent gold backing and 
was one of the most stable currencies in the world.  The Russian economy was growing rapidly 
and there were signs that the capitalist reforms of Witte and Stolypin* had put Russia on track to 
eventually become one of the wealthiest countries of Europe.  Certainly, this is not to say that 
most Russians were prosperous or even content, but the economy was at least heading in the 
right direction.  The First World War reversed this trend and inaugurated a decade of high 
inflation and general economic failure.  Like the other belligerents, the Russian Empire had to 
shift all available resources to the war effort, to the detriment of other economic activity.  Russia 
ended up spending a similar amount of money on the war as France and the United States, but 
Russia‟s government had much greater difficulty financing the expenditures than the Western 
powers.  The imperial government relied heavily on foreign borrowing to cover its budget 
deficits, which limited the amount of money it needed to print to some degree.  However, per 
capita income for Russia‟s citizens was three to five times lower than England, Germany, or 
France, which made it difficult for the Russian state to extract revenue from domestic sources.  
All of the war‟s participants went off of the gold standard and began issuing unbacked paper 
currency, but the lack of revenue led the Russian state to print money faster than the other major 
powers.2   
The imperial government‟s wartime policies resulted in economic chaos and its own 
political downfall.  By the start of 1917, the amount of rubles in circulation had increased four to 
six times, depending on the source.  In comparison, the volume of banknotes increased by 100 
percent in France, 200 percent in Germany, and during the course of the whole war, while Great 
                                                                 
*
 Sergei Witte was Imperial Russia’s Finance Minister from 1892 to 1905.  Witte is known for leading construction 
of the Trans-Siberian Railway and Russia’s industrialization.  Pyotr Stolypin was the Russian Prime Minister from 
1906 to 1911.  Stolypin undertook an agrarian reform with the goal of privatizing peasant communal land.  
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Britain money supply actually remained stable.  Not surprisingly, this created greater inflation in 
Russia than in the other three countries.  The war also created food shortages by breaking down 
transportation networks and sending farm workers to the front.  The Russian people began to feel 
the effects of inflation and shortages in the fall of 1915.  The result was essentially a 
redistribution of wealth from the urban population to the rural.  While city dwellers struggled to 
find and afford food, peasants made unprecedented profits from selling their produce and 
livestock.  As the war continued, the food-producing regions of the south had increasing 
difficulty shipping their food to the north, and shortages became especially severe in Petrograd.  
In late February of 1917, hundreds of thousands of workers (mostly women) filled the streets to 
protest food shortages, the war, and the autocracy.  Soldiers refused to fire on the crowds and 
soon joined them in open rebellion, marking the end of the Tsar Nicholas II‟s authority.  
Although it would be a stretch to say economic reasons alone brought down the autocracy, they 
clearly played a role.  After years of maintaining a stable currency, the Russian Empire collapsed 
in the midst of high inflation and food shortages, a situation that was later mirrored by the 
demise of the Soviet Union.  The obvious difference was that Imperial Russia‟s economic and 
political demise was also brought about by the loss of about 1.7 million men and widespread 
destruction from the war.3 
The imperial government‟s devaluation of the ruble was continued by the succeeding 
revolutionary governments.  Despite the population‟s great discontent with the war, rising prices, 
and the inadequate food supply, the Provisional Government chose to continue the war effort.  
This decision ensured that the economy‟s problems would continue and soon brought down this 
new government as well.  The Provisional Government issued a new ruble, known as the 
“Kerenki” after its leader Alexander Kerensky, but this did nothing to curb inflation. Meanwhile, 
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Kerensky‟s government continued to rack up huge budget deficits from the war effort.  By one 
estimate, military expenditures for 1917 were almost exactly equivalent to the year‟s budget 
deficit.†  The Provisional Government financed its deficit by printing nine billion additional 
rubles, which almost doubled the money supply from the time they took power to the end of their 
tenure.  Serious shortages of food, clothes, shoes, and other manufactured goods continued due 
to the war‟s disruptions on manufacturing, transportation, and trade.  Neither the Provisional 
Government nor the parallel Soviets (workers‟ councils) were able alleviate the supply problems, 
and the Russian people continued to suffer. Given this situation, it is unsurprising that Lenin‟s 
slogan of “Peace, Land, and Bread” was highly appealing to the Russian masses.4 
Of course, World War I was only the first of successive catastrophes that befell Russia, 
and it was soon overshadowed by the Bolshevik Revolution and the Civil War.  This was true on 
many fronts, including the monetary situation.  The Civil War and the Bolshevik economic 
policy known as War Communism led to the collapse of the ruble and even greater economic 
deprivation than the Russians had experienced during the First World War.  As soon as they took 
power, the Bolsheviks set out to transform Russian society according to textbook socialist 
principles.  The policies that lasted from 1918 to 1921 became known as “War Communism.”  
The goal of War Communism was for the state to take complete control of the nation‟s economy 
and reorganize it in a more “rational” manner that would benefit the proletariat.  Lenin‟s first 
priority was to nationalize the banks, which he believed held all the power under capitalism.  
Accordingly, by the end of the first winter, the Bolsheviks nationalized all of Russia‟s banks and 
placed them under the control of the State Bank, which they renamed the People‟s Bank.  The 
bank continued to issue billions of unbacked Kerenki rubles in 1918, but the money supply 
                                                                 
†
 Although exact figures for such a chaotic year may be unreliable, Pethybridge cites an estimate that puts the 
deficit for 1917 at 22,568 mill ion rubles (same as Katzenellenbaum) and military expenditures at 22,561 mill ion 
rubles.   
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actually grew at a slower rate than in had in the previous year.5   
Table 1.  Amount of Paper Currency 
in Circulation, 1914-1924 
Date 
Amount (in 
millions of rubles) 
July 1, 1914 1,630 
Jan. 1, 1915 2,947 
Jan. 1, 1916 5,617 
Jan. 1, 1917 9,097 
Mar. 1, 1917 9,950 
Oct. 23, 1917 18,917 
Jan. 1, 1918 27,300 
Jan. 1, 1919 60,800 
Jan. 1, 1920 225,014 
Jan. 1, 1921 1,168,600 
Jan. 1, 1922 17,543,900 
Jan. 1, 1923 1,994,500,000 
Jan. 1, 1924 178,510,000,000 
Source: Katzenellenbaum, 56-58. 
Hyperinflation 
The floodgates to hyperinflation opened in May of 1919 when the Bolsheviks gave the 
People‟s Bank permission to print as much money as it deemed necessary for the economy.  The 
bank started literally printing money as quickly as it could, and the supply of paper money began 
to grow at an exponential rate.  Starting in 1919, the Bolsheviks also began issuing their own 
paper currencies, which they called sovznaki, or Soviet tokens, in a semantic attempt to deny that 
they could not dispense with the use of money.  In fact, they virtually did destroy the ruble, as all 
of the revolutionary currencies became worthless and Imperial rubles were hoarded out of 
circulation.  Peasants had to resort to bartering or using bread and salt as currency, while the 
government had to pay workers in kind by rationing out supplies.  Although the Bolsheviks 
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realized by 1921 that they could not effectively dispense with money and needed to establish a 
stable currency, hyperinflation did not reach its apex until 1923.  The following chart shows the 
enormous growth rates of prices and the money supply.6  
Table 2. Yearly Money Emissions and Price Increases, 1913-1923 
Year 
Amount of New 
Paper Currency 
Issued (in 
Millions) 
Percentage 
Increase in 
Money 
Supply 
Price Index 
for Moscow* 
Price Index 
for Whole of 
Russia 
Percentage 
Increase in 
Prices for 
Russia 
1913 - - 1.00 1.00 - 
1914 1,317 77.1% 1.01 1.01 28.7% 
1915 2,670 90.6 1.30 1.30 20.0 
1916 3,480 61.2 1.56 1.55 93.5 
1917 16,403 180.3 3.15 3.00 683.3 
1918 33,500 119.2 27.80 23.50 597.5 
1919 164,200 302.5 278 164 1,375.6 
1920 943,600 419.3 4,180 2,420 594.2 
1921 16,375,300 1402.0 24,600 16,800 1,614.3 
1922 1,976,900,000 11,268.2 244,000 288,000 7,196.9 
1923 176,505,500,000 8,849.6 20,750,000 21,015,000 - 
Oct., 1923 - - 638,000,000 648,230,000 - 
*Price indexes show where prices stood on January 1 of the given year, except for the last numbers available from 
October 1
st
.  The other columns include changes that occurred over the course of each entire year. 
Source: Katzenellenbaum, 59, 74-75. 
As with the contemporary hyperinflations of Central Europe, one factor in the Russian 
economy‟s decline was territorial loss.  The Bolsheviks ended the war with the Central Powers 
by signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March of 1918, but this came at a cost of several 
modern countries‟ worth of territory.  The Germans did not have the manpower to hold the 
territory and were forced to pull out by the end of the year, but other hostile armies soon filled 
the vacuum.  As Russia exited the Great War, the Civil War between the Bolsheviks and their 
opponents spread across the country.  Various opposing armies marched across former Russian 
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territory, destroying railways, roads, and materials in the process.   The Bolshevik center lost 
several important agricultural and industrial regions to the White Armies in late 1918 and did not 
reestablish control until 1920.  The loss of Ukraine‟s wheat and oil fields was particularly 
damaging to the already crippled Russian economy, as well as those of the North Caucasus.  
Other losses included the textiles of Turkestan and the Baltics, the Donets coal basin, and most 
of Russia‟s iron and steel factories.  The Bolsheviks defeated the White Armies by late 1920 and 
fully routed the anarchist Black Army the following year.  The invasion of Poland in 1920 ended 
in defeat for the Red Army, and Russia concluded the Treaty of Riga with Poland in March 
1921.  In this treaty, Ukraine and Belarus were divided up with Poland, and Russia regained 
control of the eastern halves of these lands.  Poland and the Baltic States remained independent 
states and were not reconquered by Russia until the Second World War.7 
There is no hyperinflation on record that is not correlated with large government budget 
deficits, and Russia‟s first was no different.  The Imperial government ran a deficit of 39 percent 
in the first year of the war and around 75 percent the next two years.  However, it was still able 
to cover a good portion of these deficits with loans, and less than one-third of the deficits of 1915 
and 1916 was covered by issuing paper money.  In 1917, the deficit reached 81.7 percent and the 
percentage covered by note issue went up significantly to 73 percent.  As shown earlier, the 
Provisional government greatly increased the rate of currency issue to cover its budget shortfalls.  
When the Bolsheviks took over, their deficits grew even larger than those of the previous 
governments, and they started covering them entirely via the printing press.  Lenin‟s views on 
state fiscal matters were rather traditional, and he theoretically favored maintaining balanced 
budgets.  However, his subordinates in charge of finance did not share his concerns, and 
Bolshevik fiscal policies made balancing the budget or controlling inflatio n impossible.  In 
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February 1918, they repudiated all state debts, and afterwards, foreign governments and private 
lenders refused to offer loans to the new Russian state.  They attempted to cover their 
expenditures through income and property taxes, but these revenues were vastly inadequate.  
There were some efforts to keep spending under control in early 1918, but such inclinations gave 
way to unlimited money printing by 1919.8 
Accurate budgetary figures for this period are difficult to obtain because the 
Commissariat of Finance did not seem to take its job very seriously.  In May 1918, the 
department could only make the vaguest guess of how much the government was spending and 
taking in, and their best estimate for expenditures was a figure with a range of 5 billion rubles.  
In a party meeting during 1919, the Commissar of Finance, Nikolai Krestinskii, implied that his 
job had no reason to exist, stating “Finance should not exist in a socialistic community and I 
must, therefore, apologize for speaking on the subject.”  There were also practical difficulties to 
calculating the budget.  Because the ruble was depreciating so rapidly and irregularly each 
month, planning yearly budgets ahead of time was impossible.  Instead, the Commissariat of 
Finance published biannual budgets retroactively.  According to Katzenellenbaum‟s older 
estimates, the deficit percentage of expenditures in 1918 was actually lower than it had been 
during the previous three years, and the percentages of 1919-1921 were slightly higher than they 
had been during the Great War years.  Newer estimates from R. W. Davies (cited by Malle) are 
more pessimistic.  According to these figures, revenues as a percentage of expenditure never 
reached higher than 22 percent from the 1918 to 1920, and the true percentage for most of the 
period may have been in the single digits.9 
It appears that most of the spending went towards subsidizing the newly nationalized 
industries and paying their workers, as well as fighting the Civil War.  After March 1919, state 
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enterprises received all of their funding for production and wages directly from the budget.  
Their inputs were covered via the printing press and direct in kind transfers.  The Bolsheviks 
claimed that they had to continue to print money in order to pay peasants for their food, but in 
fact urban workers and bureaucrats received far more.  From 1918 to 1920, farmers received a 
total of 20 billion rubles, compared to a vastly larger total of 400 billion rubles in wage payments 
over the same period.  Ironically, one of the enterprises employing the most workers was the 
mint, with 17,361 employees by October 1921.  Defense spending was intended to be second to 
the economic enterprises according to the plan for 1919 but ended up costing more than anything 
else.  After 1920, the Civil War started to wind down and defense spending became less 
important.  Yet even when the Civil War ended, the Bolshevik government continued to run 
enormous deficits due to the waste and inefficiency of War Communism.10 
Table 3.  Budgetary Figures, 1914-1921 
Year 
(In Millions of Rubles) Percent Deficit 
on Total 
Expenditure 
Note Issue 
Revenue Expenditure Deficit 
1914 2,961 4,859 1,898 39.1 1,283 
1915 3,001 11,562 8,561 74.0 2,670 
1916 4,345 18,101 13,756 76.0 3,480 
1917 5,039 27,607 22,568 81.7 16,403 
1918 15,580 46,706 31,126 66.6 33,500 
1919 48,959 215,402 166,443 77.3 164,200 
1920 159,604 1,215,159 1,055,555 86.9 943,600 
1921 4,139,900 26,076,816 21,936,916 84.1 16,375,300 
 
Source: Katzenellenbaum, 69. 
The overall result of War Communism and Civil War was a severe collapse in economic 
output and widespread suffering for most of the population.  Gross industrial output fell to less 
than one-third of 1913 levels by 1921.  Out of the total number, output from large-scale industry 
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fell to 21 percent of its pre-war level, and production of many specific items, such as steel, 
bricks, and sugar, practically ceased.  As a result of such anemic economic performance, the 
living standard of workers, whom the revolution was supposed to benefit, fell to a third of the 
prewar level.  Wages became meaningless as hyperinflation destroyed the ruble, and workers had 
to rely on meager rations and free services to sustain themselves.  The loss of territories that 
contained important industries and fertile soil were a factor in the economic collapse, but the 
policies of War Communism also clearly played a role.  Lenin ordered the nationalization of all 
Russian industries in June of 1918, and by the end of 1920, this was virtually accomplished.11 
Table 4.  Output Comparison, 1913 and 1921 
 1913 1921 
Gross output of all industry (index) 100 31 
Large Scale industry (index) 100 21 
Coal (million tons) 29 9 
Oil (million tons) 9.2 3.8 
Electricity (billion kilowatts) 2039 520 
Pig iron (million tons) 4.2 0.1 
Steel (million tons) 4.3 0.2 
Bricks (millions) 2.1 0.01 
Sugar (million tons) 1.3 0.05 
Railway tonnage carried (millions) 132.4 39.4 
Agricultural production (index) 100 60 
Exports (in 1913 rubles) 1374 208 
Imports (in 1913 rubles) 1520 20 
Note: Some of the figures above do not refer to strictly comparable territory.  
Source: Nove, 68. 
Placing industry under direct state control was supposed to raise productivity and output 
by removing the alleged inefficiencies of capitalism, but the effect was the exact opposite.  As 
nationalization progressed, output, productivity, and the number of employed industrial workers 
continued to plummet, while illegal private trade on the black market conversely grew.  From 
22 
 
various estimates, it appears that about two-thirds of the food consumed in Russian cities during 
the period of War Communism came from the black market.  The Bolsheviks made efforts to 
stop this type of private trade, but there were limits to their power and perhaps even their 
willingness to use indiscriminate violence.  In September 1918, the authorities gave in and 
started allowing peasants to bring in up to one and a half puds (54 pounds) of grain and sell it 
freely.  Nevertheless, daily caloric intake for Russian workers dropped by 30 percent in 1919 
from the 1908-1916 average, from 3,820 calories to 2,680.12 
Russia‟s agriculture and peasantry were hurt just as badly by War Communism as 
industry and the urban population.  Whereas peasants had benefitted from the moderate inflation 
of the First World War by selling their products for higher prices, they now suffered from the 
Bolshevik hyperinflation.  Although a burgeoning black market existed for agricultural products, 
illicit trade was always dangerous and official government prices always lagged far beyond 
inflation.  The peasants also had the value of savings erased by hyperinflation, a process that was 
repeated much later when the Soviet Union collapsed.  They had accumulated an estimated total 
of 5 billion rubles in bank savings by the time of the October Revolution, as well as a possible 7-
8 billion hidden under mattresses and buried.  Although the Bolsheviks did not confiscate small 
savings accounts when they nationalized banks, they still managed to expropriate their value 
through the inflation tax.  In other words, the Soviet state gained purchasing power by printing 
money to cover its budget deficits, while the resulting inflation diminished the purchasing power 
of peasant savings.13 
However, the most unpopular policy for the peasants was the irregular seizing of farm 
products known as prodrazverstka.  The Bolsheviks resorted to this policy because peasants 
refused to sell their food at official state prices in rapidly depreciating currency.  The coercive 
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requisitioning of foodstuffs was greatly resented by the peasants and gave them far less incentive 
to produce a surplus.  This policy, combined with a severe drought, led to the first great Soviet 
famine.  The grain harvest of 1920 was only 54 percent of the average from 1909 to 1913 and the 
harvest of the following year fell to 43 percent of the pre-war levels.  Despite both domestic 
relief efforts and those of Hoover‟s American Relief Administration, an estimated 5 million 
people were killed by the famine of 1921.  Violence, chaos, hunger, and misery pervaded Russia 
and kept getting worse.  In 1920, peasant rebellions spread across Russia as fear of harsher 
requisitions and starvation grew.  That fall, the Bolsheviks could only spare 3,000 Red Army 
soldiers to deal with several thousand revolting partisans in the Tambov region.  By February of 
1921, Lenin became worried enough about losing the countryside that he began to consider 
abandoning food requisitions.  Finally, the sailors rebellion at Kronstadt the following month 
convinced the Bolsheviks that they needed to change economic policy or their government 
would collapse in the midst of inflation and starvation like the two before them.14 
Discussion 
The interesting question is whether the Bolsheviks intentionally created the 
hyperinflation due to their Marxist ideology, which called for the abolition of money, or simply 
because printing money was their only available source of finance, as in the case of the other 
great inflations of the 1920s.  Both perspectives have been argued by different authors.  Silvana 
Malle, an economist, suggests that the first Russian hyperinflation was a fairly typical one, in 
which the government used the printing press to finance its expenditures because it was not able 
to do so any other way.  Several prominent historians of Soviet Russia instead emphasize the role 
of the Bolshevik ideology and the specific policy choices to which it led.  Richard Pipes directly 
counters views such as Malle‟s and argues that hyperinflation was the result of deliberate policy 
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measures inspired by Marxist ideology, rather than “responses to desperate needs.”‡  Alec Nove 
leans towards the perspective of Pipes but points out that circumstances played a role, as well as 
ideology.  Nove cites a passage from R. W. Davies which explains that the Bolsheviks only 
moved forward with trying to establish a moneyless economy “when it proved impossible to 
stabilize the currency” and “the abolition of money [seemed] inevitable.”  Although there is 
merit to both of these types of views, the more balanced approach of Nove and Davies seems to 
make the most sense.15 
The circumstances and economic mechanisms behind Russia‟s first hyperinflation did 
mirror those of its neighbors in many ways.  As we have seen, the devaluation of the ruble began 
not after the Bolshevik Revolution, but during the First World War.  The Imperial government‟s 
military expenditures led to large budget deficits, which it financed by issuing unbacked paper 
currency after going off of the gold standard.  This process was only different from what 
happened in the other war economies by nature of degree.  The Tsar abdicated in the midst of a 
failing war effort, economic decline, and political unrest.  After the first revolution, the 
Provisional Government  took charge of a country in turmoil and only made the situation worse 
by running bigger deficits and printing more money even faster.  After the second revolution, the 
Bolsheviks did the same.  This again was scarcely different from what happened in Austria, 
Hungary, Germany, and Poland.  The consequences of war, destruction, territorial loss, political 
turmoil, and bad economic policy were enough to cause hyperinflation in all of these countries.  
Russia suffered from these problems even more than the others and made the typical mistake of 
financing government budget deficits by printing unbacked paper currency.  Thus, it could be 
said that Russia‟s first hyperinflation was a fairly typical one caused by predictable economic 
                                                                 
‡
 Specifically, Pipes counters Marxist historian E. H. Carr, who somewhat ironically holds the same view on this 
topic as the pro-market economist Silvana Malle. 
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factors.  However, each instance of hyperinflation is also attached to unique historical 
circumstances and political choices made by the relevant authorities.16   
When the Bolsheviks took over, they had to choose whether to save the existing capitalist 
monetary system in some form or try to create a socialist moneyless system of distribution.  
According to Marx, money was a source of alienation that would become unnecessary in a 
socialist economy.  The Bolsheviks were also influenced by the German Marxist Rudolf 
Hilderding, who had argued that it was banks that held all the power in advanced capitalist 
economies.  Thus, the Bolsheviks believed that nationalizing banks should be the top priority and 
socialist Russia would, at some point, no longer have a use for money.  However, Lenin and 
Trotsky apparently realized that Russia did not have an advanced capitalist economy, and they 
initially favored keeping the capitalist system under state supervision as an intermediary step in 
the transition to socialism.  The Left Communists, led by Bukharin and Obolenskii (known as 
Osinskii), refused to accept any compromise with capitalism and instead wanted to immediately 
move forward towards a planned economy that kept accounts without using money.17 
The leftist view won out in April 1918 with the decision to move forward with the 
program that came to be known as War Communism.  However, they knew it would still take 
some time to nationalize all of the country‟s private industries and create a socialist economy.  In 
the meantime, they continued to use traditional methods of public finance, such as taxation, 
monetary accounts for state enterprises, and wages for workers.  As shown earlier, tax revenue 
proved to be inadequate to cover government expenditures, so the Bolsheviks resorted to the 
printing press, like the governments before them had done.  When the value of the ruble 
continued to fall and more of the economy came under state control, the Bolsheviks became 
convinced that it would soon be possible to establish a moneyless economy.  In March 1919, 
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Lenin signed off on a Communist Party program calling for the abolition of money.  After this 
point, the Bolsheviks stopped even caring about ruble expenditures and began focusing on how 
the budget would work without the use of money.18   
It was the attempt to create a moneyless economy that caused inflation to skyrocket far 
above the previous levels it had reached.  In May 1919, the Bolsheviks made the crucial decision 
to allow the People‟s Bank to print as much money as it felt necessary.  As a result, the inflation 
rate more than doubled, from 598 percent in 1918 to 1,376 percent in 1919, officially turning 
high inflation into hyperinflation.  The following year, the government tried to use a moneyless 
budget by avoiding cash transactions and funding all state expenditures with direct advances.  
State enterprises simply delivered materials and rendered services to each other without 
payment, while workers and many other citizens received housing, transport, and whatever food 
and goods were available were for free.  Money was literally becoming worthless in the 
Bolshevik economy.  By October of 1923, prices had increased by over 648 million times from 
what they had been in 1913. Preobrazhensky, one of the other Left Communists, was proud of 
the hyperinflation the Bolsheviks had created, and Osinskii refused to admit that moneyless 
finance could not work.  However, the more moderate Bolsheviks realized by 1921 that such a 
policy was simply untenable.   Undoing what they had wrought was another matter.19  
As early as 1919, economist and theoretician Ludwig von Mises argued that rational 
economic calculation is impossible without the use of money.§  In a market economy, money 
serves as the common denominator by which people can calculate the values of a myriad of 
                                                                 
§
 Mises first presented this argument in a lecture in 1919, responding to a book by Otto Neurath which argued that 
the German war economy proved that central planning without the use of money was in fact possible.  Mises then 
published an essay based on this argument, titled "Die Wirtschaftsrechnung im sozialistischen Gemeinwesen" or 
“Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth.”  Finally, he developed it into a book in 1922, titled Die 
Gemeinwirtschaft: Untersuchungen über den Sozialismus or Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis. 
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different goods and services.  Individuals assign their own subjective values to various 
commodities they desire, and all try to obtain ones that bring them more satisfaction in exchange 
for those they consider less valuable.  Money serves as the medium of exchange to facilitate 
these trades by allowing actors to “reduce values to a common unit.”  Without the use of money, 
people looking to trade their labor or goods would have to find trade partners who both want 
what the other has to offer and have what they want in return.  For example, a farmer who has a 
spare horse and wants a plow would have to find someone who has a spare plow and needs a 
horse.  In addition, both parties would have to view this as a fair exchange.  In mainstream 
economics, this is known as the double coincidence of wants problem.  Obviously, bartering this 
way is very time-consuming and inefficient, and it would be far easier to just sell the horse for 
cash and buy a plow.  Thus, without money, trade becomes far more difficult are far less of it 
occurs.  Finally, money can also serve as a store of value or a standard of deferred payment for 
paying debts if its value remains relatively stable.  This allows people to collect savings to use 
for a later date or make purchases and investments on credit.20 
The problem with central planning based on in kind resource allocation, as Mises argues, 
is that economic value can only be calculated if capital goods can be exchanged and all factors of 
production can be compared using a common unit, i.e. money.  Prices and wages serve as signals 
to producers how to best allocate capital goods, natural resources, and labor in order to achieve 
the most efficient production methods.  In a socialist economy without price signals, the 
authorities in charge of production have no way to make these calculations.  Even if planners 
know which goods are needed most urgently, they cannot determine the opportunity costs of 
production.  If a single political entity controls every industry, the authorities can transfer capital 
goods and labor at will, but it is impossible for them to know which moves are necessary.  
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Without monetary price signals moving up or down, there is no way to adapt to changing 
conditions and adjust previous economic decisions.  The inevitable result is that some industries 
will end up with too many workers and resources and others will not have enough.  An infinite 
number of possibilities exist for the allocation of capital goods and labor, and it is impossible for 
any person or group to figure out an efficient combination without the use of monetary 
calculations.  Labor itself cannot serve as the unit of account because the value of different kinds 
of labor constantly fluctuates based on the final products each worker can create.21 
  Aside from the extenuating circumstances of war and territorial loss, the Bolshevik 
attempt to establish a moneyless economy explains why output suffered such a severe collapse.  
As the value of the ruble collapsed, it became increasingly more difficult for people to calculate 
either present or future transactions.  However, even if citizens wanted to trade or make 
investments, these activities became not only more complicated but illegal.  The Bolsheviks 
intended to be the only actors controlling economic activity, but the system they created made it 
impossible for them to do so.  The millions of people they ruled needed food more than anything, 
but they also needed housing, transportation, clothes, and numerous other goods.  As shown 
earlier, peasants had no incentive to produce a surplus to would either be exchanged for a 
worthless sum of cash or simply taken away.  The peasants might have been willing to trade their 
food for industrials goods, but the government had virtually none to give them. 
The Bolsheviks were able nationalize virtually all of Russia‟s industry, but industrial 
output suffered decline even worse than the agricultural sector.  By late 1919, the Supreme 
Council of the National Economy (VSNKh or Vesenkha) controlled thousands of enterprises 
with over a million workers.  Bukharin, the leader of the Left Communists, conceived of VSNKh 
as a single firm that controlled all of these constituent parts, distributed their inputs, and told 
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them which goods to produce, how many, and in what priority.  All of these enterprises were 
supposed to exchange their inputs and output through VSNKh without the use of money as a unit 
of account.  As Mises predicted, the enterprises were baffled as to how to even do this, and the 
attempt ended in complete failure.  Some of the Bolshevik theoreticians discussed ways to 
establish “labor units” as the common denominator, but they were unable to implement any of 
these ideas before War Communism ended.  By 1921, the Bolshevik leaders realized that it was 
simply impossible for them to administrate thousands of different enterprises without the use of 
money.  In March, they decided that they needed to change their economic policy and try to 
stabilize the currency after all.22 
Stabilization 
The failure of War Communism and a moneyless economic system became so obvious 
that the Bolsheviks were forced to temporarily abandon their attempts to enact Marxist-Leninist 
principles and allow some market activity.  The New Economic Policy (NEP), which began in 
1921, established a mixed economy, as a compromise between communism and capitalism.  
Since NEP made private trade legal again, it required a stable currency in order to work.  
However, achieving this was easier said than done, and inflation only worsened after the 
Bolsheviks released price controls.  Desperately seeking a stable unit of account, they calculated 
the 1922 budget in terms of pre-war rubles.  Preobrazhensky remarked that this type of currency 
“was based on the memory of what prices had been 1913.”  Obviously, this was not a solid 
enough backing to guarantee the ruble‟s value.  As long as the printing press rapidly churned out 
rubles, inflation continued.23 
Much like the preceding hyperinflation, the stabilization that followed came in an 
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orthodox, economically predictable fashion.  In July 1922, the Bolsheviks decided to completely 
change their fiscal policies.  They resolved to balance the budget and issue a new currency, 
known as the chervonets, that would be based on the gold standard.  The chervonets was issued 
in late 1922 and circulated alongside the paper sovznak.  The former was in short supply and 
highly demanded, while the value of the latter fell to almost nothing.  Finally, the chervonets was 
established as the only legal currency in February 1924, and sovznaki issued in 1923 were 
exchanged at a ratio of 15,000 to one.   In order to keep from having to print more money, the 
Soviet government balanced its budget in the fiscal year 1923-24 and ran a surplus in 1924-25.  
This was accomplished by levying several new types of taxes, as well as collecting interest off of 
both voluntary and coerced savings.  In addition, the State Bank became independent again, and 
a new, more conservative leader was put in charge of the Commissariat of Finance, Grigori 
Sokolnikov.  As it became clear to the population that the Bolsheviks were serious about their 
change in fiscal policy and commitment to a stable currency, velocity** fell drastically and 
hyperinflation finally ended.24 
The stabilization of the ruble closely follows Thomas Sargent‟s theory of “rational 
expectations” and the examples he describes.  Sargent argues that firms and workers are rational 
to expect high inflation when “the government‟s current and prospective monetary and fiscal 
policies warrant those expectations.”  While isolated actions to combat inflation are not effective 
in changing expectations, a change in policy regime or long-term strategy can convince the 
public.  Sargent lists common features of how all four of the contemporary Central European 
inflations were stopped.  All four countries balanced their budgets and established independent 
                                                                 
**
 Velocity is a measure of the average frequency with which money is spent.  High velocity is associated with 
hyperinflation because people try to spend money as quickly possible before it loses its value.  In Russia, velocity 
was 54.7 in 1922, before fall ing to 23.2 in 1923 and 13 in 1924. 
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central banks that refused to grant unsecured credit to their governments. This kept the 
governments from issuing more debt than they could back with future taxes and from relying on 
the central banks for their finances.  As soon as the public understood that these changes 
occurred, inflation stopped.  Indeed, when the Bolsheviks simply counted their budget in pre-war 
rubles, this did nothing to stabilize the currency.  However, as soon as they balanced the budget, 
made the central bank independent, and issued a new gold-backed ruble, hyperinflation 
immediately stopped.25 
Table 5. The Percentage Rate of Change of the Money Stock, 
the Price Level, and Output, 1919-27 
Year Money Stock Prices Total Output Industrial Output Agricultural Output 
1919-20 405 978 -10 -9 -10 
1920-21 599 869 -12 10 -20 
1921-22 16,420 7,590 47 64 39 
1922-23 (monetary reform) 18 28 13 
1923-24 128 37 3 22 -9 
1924-25 89 - 42 43 41 
1925-26 40 11 13 21 6 
1926-27 24 -3 1 8 -6 
 
Source: Pickersgill, 1039. 
By allowing private trade and creating a stable currency, the New Economic Policy led to 
tremendous growth in output.  When market activity was first legalized in 1921, the economy 
saw an immediate and substantial recovery, despite the ongoing hyperinflation at the time.  The 
monetary reform of 1922-23 was successful in drastically reducing inflation to 37 percent the 
following year, however, output growth also declined to a negligible 3 percent.††  This negative 
side-effect can be interpreted in two ways.  It can either be seen as support for the view that 
reducing inflation also leads to a significant drop in output, or the Soviet economy simply took 
                                                                 
††
 Until  1930, the Soviet fiscal year began in October 1 and ended September 30
th
. 
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some time to recover from hyperinflation.  The evidence seems to support the latter 
interpretation.  The inflation rate reached its peak in October 1923, and the Soviet budget was 
first balanced the next fiscal year.  The chervonets was only established as the sole legal 
currency in February 1924 and took some time to get out to the peasants in the countryside.  In 
addition, the freedom of contract was further defined in 1924 in a decree that legalized the 
leasing of land and allowed farmers to hire laborers.  As industry and agriculture adjusted to the 
newly stabilized currency and greater tolerance for market activity, NEP hit its peak in 1924-25, 
and the fiscal year saw another enormous increase in output.  In 1926, Russian industrial and 
agricultural output finally caught up to pre-war levels.26   
Most of this increase in growth was from the development of the newly legalized private 
industry and trade.  The government retained control of the “commanding heights” of the 
economy and state enterprises produced most wholesale goods, while the private sector was 
allowed to take over small-scale industry and compete with official outlets in retail trade.  State 
industries remained highly inefficient due to excessive overhead costs and low labor 
productivity, so their final products ended up being more expensive than those produced by 
private industry.  Due to their higher prices, state stores and cooperates could not compete with 
private traders, known as Nepmen.  In the early years of NEP, private trade was responsible for a 
vast majority of retail sales across Russia, a total of 78 percent in 1922-23.  The following fiscal 
year, the proportion of private retail trade fell to 57.7 percent and then to around 42 percent in 
the following two years, although the overall volume of private trade continued to increase 
though 1925-26.  After this point, the Soviet government began to clamp down on private trade 
by depriving the Nepmen of manufactured goods, fuel, and raw materials, and by raising taxes to 
cut into their profits.  The share of private trade declined to 36.9 percent in 1926-27, while the 
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overall volume remained stagnant and began to fall drastically after the next year.‡‡  As private 
economic activity ceased to grow, so did the Soviet economy as a whole.27 
Table 6.  Private Turnover during and after NEP, 1922-1930 
Year 
Total private turnover 
(million rubles) 
Percent of total trade 
1922-23 2680 78 
1923-24 - 57.7 
1924-25 3300 42.5 
1925-26 4963 42.3 
1926-27 5063 36.9 
1928 3406 22.5 
1929 2273 13.6 
1930 1043 5.6 
Source: Nove, 136; Bandera, 269. 
Soviet workers benefitted in many ways from the introduction of private trade and a 
stabilized currency.  In the first years before inflation stopped, the transition to a money 
economy was tough for workers.  The free rations and services that they had grown used to were 
abolished, and it was difficult for them to live on their tiny wages, which lost their purchasing 
power rapidly before 1923. Initially, there was labor unrest and strikes, but conditions soon 
improved when the currency and the economy stabilized.  The supply of goods grew with the 
development of private enterprise, and so did workers‟ wages, which were negotiated relatively 
freely during this period.  After a low point of only one-third of pre-war levels in 1920-21, wages 
almost caught up to 1913 levels in real monthly terms by 1925-26.  Working conditions also 
improved due to the enactment of labor regulations and benefits.  Such laws were passed first by 
the Provisional Government and expanded early on by the Bolsheviks, but they meant little 
during the chaos of war communism and only became reality under NEP.  A law from 1922 
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 Alec Nove writes that the overall  volume of private trade began to fall  in 1926 -27, although his statistics seem to 
indicate that the decline in total private turnover did not begin until  the following year. 
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clarified that work days were limited to eight hours, or even less for heavy labor, and workers 
received two weeks of paid holidays per year, as well as pay for sickness or unemployment.28 
Despite the economic recovery, unemployment also became a serious problem under 
NEP.  As enterprises shed the bloated staffs that they had accumulated during war communism, 
unemployment grew rapidly.  Out of a workforce of 8.5 million, which does not include 
peasants, the number of unemployed during NEP ranged from about 1 to 1.5 million.  While the 
rise of unemployment is usually blamed on the rise of market forces, this interpretation does not 
seem entirely accurate.  It is true that the government started encouraging enterprises to make 
profits and cut out excess labor, rather than paying too many workers and putting out 
unaffordable products.  At the beginning of NEP, there were simply not enough productive jobs 
available for all of Russia‟s urban laborers.  Many industries had been destroyed by a decade of 
war and unsound economic policy, and they needed time to recover.  Indeed, the unemployment 
rate rose rapidly in 1923, while the Bolsheviks were still struggling to defeat hyperinf lation, and 
reached 14.6 percent in January 1924, before the chervonets was established as the sole legal 
tender.  When private trade hit its peak in 1925, the rate fell to 11.1 percent.  Afterwards, the 
government began to clamp down on the Nepmen, and unemployment rose to 18.8 percent by 
the end of the decade.  In addition, labor regulations were partly responsible for the high 
unemployment, especially among young people, who were limited to working six-hours per day 
and enjoyed other legal privileges which made employers not want to hire them.29 
Peasant conditions improved even more significantly under NEP.  One of the main 
inspirations for abandonment of war communism in the first place was the spread of peasant 
rebellions due to the unpopular policy of food requisitions.  The was replaced by a fixed tax in 
kind, or prodnalog, in 1921, which let peasants know ahead of time how much they would need 
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to deliver.  This had the important effect of changing incentives and getting the peasants to 
produce more, because they knew they would get to keep all of their produce after the tax quota 
was reached.  After the currency was stabilized in 1924, the tax in kind was replaced by a money 
tax.  The minimal attempts to collectivize agriculture were also abandoned, and the land was left 
almost entirely in private hands, all the way to the end of NEP.  As intended, these policies 
immediately boosted agricultural production, and by 1925, the total sown area matched the 1913 
level.  However, the government continued to be the principal buyer of grain from the peasants 
and offered incredibly low prices, which made them more likely to eat their produce than sell it.  
In addition, the revolution led to the redistribution of land and with it, fewer landlords and 
kulaks, large landholders who had been responsible for most grain sales.  As a result, despite the 
recovery of total farm output, both domestic sales and exports of grain remained far below pre-
war levels.  This was one of main reasons Stalin decided to abandon NEP and collectivize 
agriculture.30 
Conclusion 
 The Bolshevik attempt to do away with money created economic chaos and domestic 
unrest, which led them to abandon in kind distribution and establish a stable currency.  The value 
of the ruble first started to fall during the First World War, after the Imperial government went 
off of the gold standard and started printing unbacked paper currency to pay for its military 
expenditures.  Rising food prices benefitted Russia‟s peasant farmers at the expense of city 
dwellers, who had to buy their products.  The food supply in the capital of Petrograd grew 
especially dire, and riots led to the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II.  The Provisional Government 
took over, but it continued the war effort and printed money even faster, so food shortages 
continued.  The Bolsheviks then came to power, claiming they could fix the economy and 
36 
 
provide food for the population.  By that time, the ruble was already in steep decline, and the 
Bolsheviks had the choice to either try to save it or move forward with establishing a moneyless 
economy.  Initially, they made some efforts to keep the budget balanced by trying to bring it 
revenue and restrain spending, but these measures were unsuccessful due to a breakdown in the 
tax system and continuing military expenditures due to the Civil War.   
By 1919, the Bolsheviks had nationalized most of Russia‟s industries and the ruble 
showed no sign of stabilizing, so they decided it was time to institute centrally planned in kind 
resource allocation and do away with money.  The central bank was given unlimited freedom to 
print money as it saw fit, and price increases officially moved into hyperinflation territory.  Even 
though the Civil War started to wind down in 1920, industrial and agricultural output continued 
to plummet due to the Bolshevik policies.  Russia was afflicted with a major famine in 1921 and 
peasants began to revolt out of fear that they would be next to starve.  These revolts and the 
Kronstadt sailors rebellion convinced Lenin that the government had to legalize some market 
activity and establish a stable currency after all, or else the Bolsheviks would not be able to hold 
power for much longer.  Stabilization finally occurred in 1923, in an economically predictable 
fashion, when the Soviet government balanced its budget, issued a gold-backed currency, and 
made the central bank independent again.  
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CHAPTER 3 
REPRESSED INFLATION AND SHORTAGES 
 
By artificially fixing prices and repressing inflation, the Soviet system of price controls 
created persistent shortages of food and consumer goods.  The price control system was 
established after Stalin decided to do away with the New Economic Policy in 1928 and remained 
in place as long as the Soviet Union existed.  Before and during the Second World War, the 
Soviet economy suffered from both open inflation, as official prices in state stores increased a 
moderate rate every year, but market prices in collective farm markets increased even faster.  
Both types of inflation were eradicated in 1947 with a currency reform, but only open inflation 
was conquered for long.  For the rest of the post-war era, prices in state stores and co-operatives 
were strictly controlled and subsidized, so they changed very little until the late 1980s.  This 
caused the economy to suffer from repressed inflation, which can be defined as rising excess 
demand that leads to excess liquid assets in the hands of the population instead of higher prices.1  
Because production was controlled by political authorities, rising demand did not lead to a 
greater supply, and shortages were pervasive in the Soviet economy.  As a result, the standard of 
living in the Soviet Union was far below what it was in the West. 
Open and Repressed Inflation: 1921-1949 
Despite the government‟s efforts, prices were set mostly by market forces during the 
early 1920s.  In 1921, when NEP began, the Bolsheviks established a Prices Committee under 
the Commissariat of Finance.  This committee was given the authority to set prices for goods 
sold by state enterprises or purchased by the government from private sources, such as peasants.  
However, these attempts to control prices were largely ineffective, and traders were usually able 
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to negotiate prices themselves.  Inflation was rampant during these years, and it was necessary to 
change prices frequently in order for them to have any meaning.  A majority of retail turnover 
was private prior to 1924-25, which made it easier to avoid price controls.  In 1923, free pricing 
led to what is known as the “scissors crisis.”  Whereas peasants previously had favorable terms 
of trade with the city, this situation reversed itself as industrial prices rose much faster than 
agricultural.  A variety of factors were responsible for this, the most important of which being 
that Russia‟s harvests recovered far more quickly than its industrial production.*  At the peak of 
the crisis in October 1923, industrial prices were three times higher than agricultural prices, in 
comparison to 1913.2 
In response to the “scissors crisis,” the Soviet government began to impose stricter price 
controls on state and cooperative sales.  Prices became easier for the government to control as 
private trade declined and state industry expanded in the latter half of the 1920s.  This policy had 
predictable results that continued for the rest of Soviet history:  shortages of consumer goods, 
long lines in front of stores, selective access to goods, and a gap between official and free prices.  
The goal of the controls was to lower prices for peasants in the village, but the effect was the 
opposite.  Those who lived in cities, near the factories, were able to purchase goods at the low 
official prices, and the stores quickly sold out.  Private traders would then transport the cheap 
goods they had just purchased to the villages and sell them at much higher rates, a practice that 
was derided as speculation.  Members of cooperatives and trade unions also had greater access to 
goods, much as Communist Party members and others with connections later did.  According to 
official statistics, the fiscal year of 1926-27 actually saw slight deflation, and food prices only 
                                                                 
*
 Pickersgil l’s statistics, cited in Chapter 1, seem to indicate that industrial output grew faster than agricultural, but 
Alec Nove cites figures that show the opposite and explains why this was so.  Agriculture recovered quickly as 
peasant planted and harvested more crops, but industries simply took longer to physically rebuild after years of 
destruction. 
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rose by 10.5 percent by 1929.  However, these figures do not take into account private food 
prices, which rose continuously after 1926 and more than doubled by 1929.  The disparity for 
manufactured goods was not quite as significant, but private prices remained higher and rose 
faster.3 
Table 7.  Comparison of Private and Official Prices, 1926-1929 
 
(1913 = 100) 
Food Manufactures 
Private Official Private Official 
1926 (December) 198 181 251 208 
1927 (December) 222 175 240 188 
1928 (June) 293 184 253 190 
1929 (June) 450 200 279 192 
 Nove, 157.  
 After NEP ended, the Soviet government introduced a multi-tiered price system with 
varying degrees of price controls.  In 1928-29, rationing of food and consumer good became 
widespread throughout Russia.  According to Alec Nove, this was “perhaps the first and only 
recorded instance of the introduction of rationing in time of peace.”4  Goods were sold at the 
official ration prices in state stores, which required ration coupons, but other types of stores had 
other price levels, ranging from controlled to free.  Workers were able to purchase some items 
from special shops that were closed to the public, where prices were higher but the workers were 
able to get items unavailable elsewhere.  Food and manufactured goods were also sold to the 
working class in other stores for prices that were above rationed levels, but below commercial 
prices.  Other stores, known as torgsin, had goods available only in exchange for precious metals 
or foreign currency, which the state badly needed.  Finally, prices freely were set by market 
forces at peasant bazaars, kolkhoz (collective farm) markets, and black markets.5 
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 Unsurprisingly, prices rose much faster where they were influenced by market forces, 
than in state stores, in which inflationary pressure manifested itself in shortages instead.  
Artificially low prices led to products selling out quickly and shelves laying barren until the next 
delivery.  In state stores, consumers were expected to take whatever they could find and move 
on.  These problems developed as soon the government was able to effectively enforce price 
controls and continued, to varying degrees, for the rest of Soviet history.  Consumer demand that 
went unfulfilled in state stores spilled over into the tiny market sector.  Because the free sector 
was so small in comparison to the excess demand created at state stores, market prices often had 
to be several times higher than official ones, in order for supply and demand to balance.  For 
instance, commercial prices, which were set by the state but close to market rates, were twenty 
times higher for bread in 1933, six times higher for sugar, and fourteen times higher for 
sunflower oil.6   
Although data are somewhat limited, the chart below makes clear that the free prices at 
collective farm markets were usually much higher than the official prices in state stores in 
cooperatives.  This gap between official and market prices shows that repressed inflation also 
became a problem very early in Soviet times.  Nevertheless, there was also open inflation in state 
stores during this time, for two reasons.   First, wage increases were higher than productivity 
gains, because enterprise managers tried to hire as many workers as possible in an effort to fulfill 
overly ambitious plan targets.  This led not only to overstaffing but also higher wages as each 
enterprise tried to offer higher wages in order to lure workers in.  Second, investments in heavy 
industry during the 1930s were much higher than they were for consumer goods.  Thus, many 
workers toiled and received their wages without creating any goods that they could purchase.  
Again, these problems also existed for most of the Soviet period, but authorities chose to keep 
42 
 
inflation repressed in the post-war era.7 
Table 8.  Soviet Price Trends, 1928-1956 (in rubles) 
Year 
Basic Industrial 
Goods (excluding 
petroleum) 
Average Annual 
Wage (Workers) 
Prices in State  
and Co-operative 
Stores 
Prices in 
Collective Farm 
Markets 
1928 100 100 100 100+ 
1929 98 114 - - 
1930 96 133 - - 
1931 96 160 - 630 
1932 97 203 / 226* 200 / 255 3000(max) / 769 
1933 100 223 400 1,500-2,000 
1934 101 264 - 1,200-1,680 
1935 103 323 - 900-1,470 
1936 157 406 700 700+ 
1937 175 432 700 700+ 
1938 180 493 - - 
1939 201 - 840 - 
1940 231 579 1000 1,780 
1941 240 - - 2,220 
1942 244 - - 13,850 
1943 246 - - 31,220 
1944 249 822 - 26,335 
1945 249 - 2,545 13,575 
1946 249 - 3,180 - 
1947 249 992 3,895 11,530 
1948 249 - 3,235 4,175 
1949 669 - 2,770 2,880 
1950 556 - 2,215 2,770 
1951 551 1,128 2,035 2,810 
1952 523 1,140 1,925 3,100 
1953 523 1,164 1,740 2,595 
1954 523 1,190 1,640 2,855 
1955 510 1,204 1,640 2,855 
1956 497 1,240 1,640 2,610 
*Alternative 1932 figures from Nove, 204, 206.  
Source: Holzman, “Soviet Inflationary Pressures,” 168-169. 
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Inflation started getting out of control during the Second World War.  Due to the 
necessary war expenditures, the Soviet government started running its first budget deficits since 
the stabilization under NEP and was forced to pay for some percentage of these with new 
currency issues.  During the war, strict price controls and subsidies kept inflation in official 
stores limited.  However, collective farm market prices began increasing much faster than they 
had during the 1930s and reached hyperinflationary levels during the war.  After 1944, the 
government was able to balance its budget again and increase the supply of goods in state stores, 
so the rate of inflation began to decline from the peak of 1943.  Nevertheless, official prices were 
almost four times higher in 1947 than they had been in 1940, while kolkhoz prices were six and a 
half times higher than 1940 levels and four times higher than state prices at the time.  Thus, the 
Soviet economy was suffering from both high rates of both open and repressed inflation.8 
 Inflation was wiped out in the Soviet Union with the Currency Reform of 1947.  Under 
this reform, old rubles were mandatorily exchanged for new ones at a 10 to 1 ratio.  As Franklyn 
Holzman argues, there were other ways that the Soviet government could have eliminated 
repressed inflation, such as higher prices and taxes.  However, as in the First World War, higher 
food prices benefitted the peasants more than other groups, i.e. workers, and left more cash in 
their hands.  Of course, Soviet leaders had always been biased against peasants and wanted to 
eliminate inflation at the expense of peasants, not workers.  Higher prices would have been 
detrimental to workers, while the currency requisition and reform took purchasing power away 
from the peasants.  The currency reform was indeed successful in getting rid of inflation for the 
time being.  Official prices began to deflate and continued to do so until the mid-1950s.  This 
was largely because productivity began growing faster than wages and nonconsumption 
expenditures fell, in contrast to the previous two decades.  Collective farm market prices also fell 
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for the few years after the reform, but began to separate from official prices again after 1950.  
Repressed inflation was simply unavoidable as long as price controls remained and continued to 
plague the Soviet economy until the collapse.9 
Repressed Inflation: 1949-1985 
Since Stalin, Soviet leaders were determined to increase the country's economic growth, 
but they attempted to do so without paying attention to the laws of economics.  The state 
controlled almost all the means of production, and most economic decisions were made by the 
authorities.  Administrative bodies set target production goals and allocated capital and labor as 
they considered necessary.  Planners aimed to increase output as much as possible and were not 
concerned with shortages on the consumer market.  They distributed currency based on political 
considerations, without any need to repay it, essentially making money a “free good” to 
producers.  Managers were rewarded for increasing the gross value of their output, which was 
calculated by adding up the cost of inputs, so they were incredibly wasteful with their resources.    
Inevitably, the Soviet system created “enormous disproportions, some of which had serious 
consequences.”  Its inefficiency was, however, masked by the country's abundant labor and raw 
materials.10 
 After decades of rapidly growing output and living standards, the Soviet economy began 
to slow down around 1970, while supply and demand started to become more unbalanced.  
Ironically, economic stagnation began during Brezhnev's “gross output drive.”  Under this 
strategy, Soviet planners went back to the old strategy of focusing on rapid growth in heavy 
industry and defense, while ignoring consumption.  The focus on haste and pure quantity, 
without consideration for the quality of products or consumers‟ needs, led to waste, inefficiency, 
and low growth rates in the long run.  The growth of inputs decreased, as resources were used 
45 
 
too quickly, capital stock was allowed to age, and workers had no incentive to increase 
productivity.  External factors, such as lower prices for exported materials also played a role.  
Neglecting research and development led to slow adaptation to new technologies and new 
products.  During the 1970s, the Soviet Union's GNP growth dropped to nearly half of what it 
was in the 1960s and virtually stagnated by the early 1980s.  In addition, a “large and growing 
gap appeared between the goals of the producer and the needs of the consumer.”11 
Source: Hanson, 5. 
 Because food prices were subsidized and the supply of consumer goods was not 
increased, many workers saved a portion of their incomes.  Ever since raising prices on meat and 
butter in 1962 led to a riot in Novocherkassk, the authorities tried to avoid raising prices on basic 
food items.  In 1965, Brezhnev‟s chief economic minister Kosygin introduced a reform that 
included retail price subsidies for basic foods, in order to keep their prices stable.  Workers‟ 
wages, however, did not stay stable.  In a centrally planned economy, the production sector is not 
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supposed to be part of the monetary economy.  The Soviet state bank provided enterprises with 
credits needed for inputs, and balances remaining in accounts were wiped at the end of each year.  
However, the production center still contributed to monetary expansion through wage payments.  
Yet with food prices subsidized and shortages on the consumer market, workers chose to save 
part of their income.12   
Although many authors assume that the savings were forced, Peter Boettke argues that 
individuals chose to save their incomes voluntarily, with the expectation that goods would be 
available later.  Interviews with Russians who lived through the Soviet times confirm this 
argument.  “People save in order to consume later,” write Birman and Clarke, “so savings in 
general can be defined as delayed demand for consumer goods.”13  While some did save up 
thousands of rubles during the course of their life, it was done in the hopes of buying a car later 
or simply as a rainy day fund.  Although the selection in stores was indeed bland and meager, 
some Russians spent their extra income on vacations or new appliances and did not amass any 
significant savings.  Domenico Nuti has also claimed that the population could spend any extra 
income in the small free sector that continued to exist in the collective farms and black markets.  
Although this may have been true to some extent, Russians who were interviewed did not 
consider these sales very significant.14   
Since the 1970s, workers almost continuously earned more money than they spent and 
savings continued to grow.  In the second half of the 1980s, the gap between income and 
spending became much larger.  As a result, the percentage of income put into savings also grew.  
In 1980, the population saved 4.1 percent of their wages and the number continued to grow 
throughout the decade, reaching 13 percent by the first quarter of 1991.  As demand grew from 
increased savings, supply did not increase accordingly, and the result was more shortages and 
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longer lines.  The increase in demand should have caused prices to increase, but because prices 
were fixed, it instead led to repressed inflation.  According to Byung-Yeon Kim, the proportion 
of forced savings of the total increased from 9 percent in 1965 to 42 percent in 1989.  It is 
possible that the savings truly did become in voluntary in the late 1980s as wages were increased 
far more rapidly than they had been before, but shortages became even worse.  Whether Soviet 
savings were forced or voluntary, savings by Soviet citizens served no productive purpose.  
Rather than financing investment, as savings would in a market economy, and simply languished 
in bank accounts.15   
The growing accumulation of savings became “monetary overhang,” in economic terms, 
and caused a drastic increase in the Soviet money supply.  The government had tried to control 
both consumer demand and cash holdings, but lost control over both, as a result of the 1965 
reform.  Producers used cash only to pay their employees, so the primary constituent of money 
supply was cash held by the population, including savings bank deposits and state bonds.  
According to Birman and Clarke, only 15-30 billion rubles were needed for cash circulation in 
1985, yet the actual money supply at that time was over 200 billion rubles.  By their estimates, 
the total money supply was an astonishing seven to ten times what was needed for regular use.  
The population was overpaid in relation to how few consumer items were available to buy.  They 
became increasingly frustrated at shortages and long lines. The state could no longer increase 
labor productivity, its “most pressing objective,” because additional money was no longer an 
incentive to work harder.  Consumer demand vastly exceeded supply, and the Soviet economy 
moved further from equilibrium.16 
Effects 
Communism simply failed to provide the high standard of living that it promised to 
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ordinary people and never came close to matching the relative prosperity of the West.  Per capita 
income in the Soviet Union peaked at just over one-third of United States levels, yet even this 
number overestimates their well-being.  After all, increasing yearly output, as measured in 
macroeconomic statistics, does not necessarily correlate with improving conditions for the 
masses.  This is true even for market economies, but statistics and reality were even farther apart 
in the command system.  Both in the Five-Year-Plans and their subsequent implementation, 
Soviet officials prioritized allocation of resources towards defense and heavy industry over 
consumer goods.  As Philip Hanson puts it, “If steel, say, was in shorter supply than originally 
planned, it was the production of bicycles that would lose out, not that of tanks or machine-
tools.”17  Estimates show that in the 1980s, about 50-55 percent of Soviet GNP went towards 
consumption and anywhere from 10 to 25 percent to the military, compared to 65 percent and 7 
percent in the United States, respectively.  Agricultural production accounted for about 30 
percent of Soviet GDP, as opposed to only around 2 percent in the United States, but the Soviet 
collective farms were notoriously inefficient.  These factors created never-ending shortages of 
food and consumer goods, which often meant that even if workers had money to spend, there 
was nothing worthwhile available for them to purchase.18 
The results of the central planners‟ priorities were telling.  The Soviet military was long 
considered to be on par with that of the United States, with its much larger economy.  The trade-
off was dismal conditions for consumers.  On average, Americans and Soviets ate almost the 
same amount of calories per day (3300 and 3380), but the comparison ends there.  A commonly 
used indicator of consumer living standards is the proportion of their incomes that goes to food 
costs.  In the mid-1980s, the average Soviet spent 59 percent of his or her monthly income on 
food, versus only 15.2 percent for average Americans.  This was even worse than in 1927, when 
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Soviet workers spent 43.8 of their income on food.  The quality of Soviet diets was also much 
poorer.  Bread and potatoes made up 46 percent of daily caloric intake, while meat and fish only 
accounted for 8 percent, if lard and by-products are not included.  For the United States, these 
numbers were 22 and 20 percent, respectively.  Amazingly, per capita meat consumption for the 
Russian/Soviet Empire was actually lower in 1985 than it was in 1913, falling from 88 kilograms 
annually to 62 kilograms.  Fresh fruit and vegetables were only available during harvest time in 
the Soviet Union, and almost non-existent otherwise.  Indeed, Philip Hanson states that bread, 
potatoes, and vodka were the only food products that were not usually in shortage.19 
 Other basic indicators of living standards, such as housing and clothing, were no better 
than the food supply.  Lenin had once declared that each person should get 9 square meters of 
housing space, and indeed, by 1989, the median allotment was estimated between 9 and 12 
square meters.  The corresponding figure the United States was 55.3 square meters per person.  
Getting an apartment at all was usually difficult, and people had to often wait for years before 
one was allocated to them.  Soviet consumption of textile products per person was 30 percent of 
U.S. levels and a 97.6 percent for shoes.20  Although clothes and shoes were usually available in 
Russian stores, the selection was usually very poor.  Clothing stores generally had racks of 
identically styled items, with perhaps two color variations.  The selection of shoes was also poor, 
and some people called Soviet shoes “wooden” because they were uncomfortable.  However, 
others argue that Soviet shoes were better quality and lasted longer than the cheap off-brand 
shoes available in the former Soviet Union today.21 
 One of the major weaknesses of the Soviet economy was a lag in acquiring new 
technologies and new products, and this was reflected in the population.  Soviet housing was not 
only smaller, but also of lower quality than in the United States.  Figures from 1986 show that 80 
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percent of American homes had central heating, 75 percent were connected to sewers, and 59 
percent were air-conditioned.  In the Soviet Union, most apartments were heated by old-
fashioned radiators, hot water was often unavailable, and air conditioning unheard-of.  While 90 
percent of American households had telephones, a meager 10-12 percent did in the Soviet Union, 
and even these were often on shared lines with neighbors.†  Overall Soviet consumption of 
durable goods was 14 percent of the United States level.  Washing and drying machines 
remained rare, and many Soviets continued to wash their clothes by hand and dry them on 
clotheslines.  Televisions were as ubiquitous as in the United States, although the quality was 
lower, and black and white sets were not uncommon.  On the other hand, the Soviet Union had 
only 200,000 computers in 1987, compared to 25 million in the United States.  Another of the 
greatest disparities was in the availability of cars, which stood around 7 percent of the U.S. levels 
in 1988, 55 cars for every 1000 people compared to 771 per 1000.22 
Table 9. USSR: Household Access to Utilities  
and Other Amenities, 1989 (in percent) 
 State Private 
Central heating 85 12 
Water supply 87 21 
Sewage 84 11 
Hot water 69 3 
Gas stove 81 75 
Electric stove 14 1 
Bathroom or shower 77 8 
Telephone 37 12 
 
Source: IMF, 340. 
 Finally, the best indicator of Soviet living standards may be the state of health and 
                                                                 
†
 I can stil l  remember from when I was very young, my family had a neighbor named Lyuba who liked to talk on the 
phone for long periods of time and often tied up the shared phone line.  However, I was shocked to now learn that 
only 1 in 10 families even had a telephone and had to verify this statistic across three sources. 
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medical services.  Medical care was guaranteed to the entire Soviet population and provided for 
free, but the quality was incredibly poor.  Shortages extended even to hospitals and contributed 
to alarming health problems in the Soviet Union.  In the late 1980s, one out of six hospitals 
lacked running water entirely, and about 30 percent were not connected to sewer lines.   In 1988, 
the USSR minister of health estimated that, overall, there were seven to ten times fewer facilities 
per hospital bed than in the United States.‡  Pharmacies were likewise affected by shortages, and 
it was often difficult for people to get their necessary medicines.  Of course, health care in the 
United States was vastly more expensive, yet American consumption of medical services was 
still three times higher.23 
 Another major source of health problems for Soviets was pollution in the environment.  
In the worst areas, health risks from pollution were estimated to be 10 to 100 times than 
acceptable levels in the West.  For most of the Soviet era, environmental concerns were largely 
ignored, and the first official data on the state of the environment and associated health effects 
was not published until 1988.  Many industries used old and inefficient machinery, and 38 
percent of emission sources were not even equipped for pollution control.  As a result, it has 
been estimated that air pollutant levels in Soviet cities were from 10 to 50 times higher than in 
Germany or France.  Due to air pollution (and most likely, nearly ubiquitous smoking habits), 
rates of death from respiratory illnesses were 2.8 times higher for men and 1.7 times higher for 
women than in several Western countries.  Improper waste disposal and the lack of sewer 
systems led to poor water quality and disease outbreaks.  Municipal water was not adequately 
purified, and many Soviets continued to drink from wells and natural flowing water, which could 
often become contaminated.  Poor water quality led to 900,000 cases of hepatitis per years, 
sixteen times higher than the United States.  Soviet farms continued to use the notorious 
                                                                 
‡
 It is unclear from the source which specific facilities the minister of health had in mind.   
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pesticide DDT 20 years after it was banned in the West, and 10 percent of Soviet food samples 
were found to be unsafe for human consumption.   The nuclear disaster at Chernobyl in 1986 was 
a watershed moment that caused great concern for the environment and anger at the 
government‟s mishandling of it.24 
 A few statistics on life and death illustrate where the overall health situation stood in the 
Soviet Union.  Cancer rates for males were 1.5 times higher than in the West, although women 
fared better with a comparative ratio of 1.04.  In 1985, the Soviet infant mortality rate was 25.1 
deaths in the first year per 1,000 births, significantly higher than the United States at 10.4 and 
even East Germany at 9.2.25  However, many would-be infants never even had a chance.  As 
with other consumer goods and pharmaceuticals, contraceptives were either unavailable or of 
low quality.  On the other hand, abortion was easily available and free under the Soviet medical 
system, so it became the primary method of birth control.  The average Soviet woman had about 
two abortions during her childbearing years, but it was not uncommon to have more than five, or 
even upwards of ten.26  Soviet life expectancies increased by an impressive 20 years during the 
Stalin era, but then they actually started dropping after hitting a peak in the early 1970s.  The  
Table 10. Average Life Expectancy at Birth  
in the Soviet Union (in years) 
Year Total Population  Men Women 
1938-39 46.9 44.0 49.7 
1955-56 67 63 69 
1958-59 68.9 64.4 71.7 
1971-72 69.5 64.5 73.6 
1978-79 67.9 62.5 72.6 
1983-84 67.9 62.6 72.8 
1984 67.7 62.4 72.6 
1985 68.4 63.3 72.9 
1986 69.6 65.0 73.6 
Source: Ryan, 1513. 
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average for men fell by two years, from 64.5 to 62.5 and for women by one year, from 73.6 to 
72.6.  Only in 1985 did the numbers begin to grow again.  By contrast, U.S. life expectancies 
were slightly higher in 1972 and continued to grow steadily ever since, from 67.4 and 75.1 in 
1972 to 71.1 and 78.2 in 1984.27 
Discussion 
In the former Soviet Union, people now face high unemployment and long for the 
guaranteed jobs that existed under communism, yet this practice was responsible for many of the 
aforementioned economic woes.  Unemployment was virtually non-existent in the Soviet Union 
until the Gorbachev era because excess demand for labor was intrinsic to the system.  Soviet 
laws made it difficult to fire workers, but firms rarely even wanted to do so.  Due to high output 
targets and shortages of resources, enterprises tried to compensate by hiring as many workers as 
possible.  This ensured a certain level of comfort for the workers, but it did little to increase their 
material prosperity.  Soviet labor was inefficient and misallocated, which is why shortages 
prevailed  for most products and there was little for workers to buy.  Low labor productivity 
became one of the major problems of the Soviet economy in the post-war era.  The threat of 
repression under Stalin went a long way towards ensuring plan discipline, but the liberalization 
that began under Khrushchev caused discipline to soften.  This left Soviet workers with neither 
carrot nor stick to motivate them.  If they did not work hard, it was unlikely they would get fired 
or punished.  If they did work hard, they were unlikely to be rewarded with better pay, and even 
if they were, there was not much available to purchase with it.§  Ironically, the situation would 
not have improved much even if Soviet workers had exerted more effort.  Some enterprises 
employed too many workers, other did not have enough, and there was no guarantee that any of 
                                                                 
§
 The well-known Soviet cliché was “We pretend to work, and you pretend to pay  us.” 
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them were producing goods that were valuable to consumers.28 
   Communism was supposed to serve the needs of workers, but the Soviet system was not 
structurally capable of doing so.  After all, when workers go to spend their paychecks they 
become consumers.  In a free market, competing firms decide which goods to produce, their 
amounts, and their prices based on signals from consumers.  Of course, this process is the 
antithesis of communism.  In the early days, the Bolsheviks attempted to establish a moneyless 
system where the state rationed out everything in kind directly to workers.  This experiment 
failed and they were forced to acquiesce to commodity production and wage labor.  After the 
brief interlude of the New Economic Policy ended in 1928, the Soviet state essentially became a 
monopoly corporation responsible for paying and producing everything for its citizens.  Workers 
were still paid money wages and used these for whatever they were willing and able to purchase, 
just as in a capitalist system.  The primary difference was that instead of independent businesses 
competing with each other for consumers‟ money, every Soviet firm was part of a single 
hierarchy in which central planners made all of the decisions about production.  The General 
Secretary was ultimately responsible for all decisions, while the Politburo and lower ministries 
designed the plans and passed them on to the enterprises, farms, etc.  Thus, producers were only 
beholden to the planners above them and were not responsive to the wishes of consumers.  The 
planners had no particular reason to care about public well-being and could ignore growing 
consumer demand, so the consumer market remained in a perpetual state of shortage even as 
total output was growing.29  
To varying degrees, shortages plagued the Soviet consumer market from the time of the 
revolution all the way to the collapse.  Under Lenin and Stalin, the Soviet Union experienced 
three major famines, two hyperinflations, and little material improvement for consumers.  The 
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Soviet people hoped that Stalin would finally relax his repressive policies after the war and focus 
on improving the lives of workers, as the official ideology dictated.  Instead, many of those 
liberated from Nazi-occupied lands were sent off to gulags, and the Soviet Union was afflicted 
with its third famine.  After Stalin‟s death, Khrushchev shifted investment priorities towards 
consumption and agriculture, which did improve per capita consumption and caused inequality 
to decrease.  There were no more chaotic upheavals or mass starvations, but shelves were often 
empty, queues could be long, and the quality of products was poor.  Consumption continued to 
grow under Brezhnev, yet incomes grew faster than the supply of goods, so shortages persisted.  
Midway through Brezhnev‟s tenure, even the official GNP growth rates slowed down, and the 
Soviet Union ceased to be catching up with the United States after 1973.  By Gorbachev‟s time, 
the economy had almost completely stagnated, and he felt that perestroika was necessary to get 
the economy growing again and improve conditions for its citizens.30 
 
Source: Hanson, 244. 
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Conclusion 
 Price controls led to repressed inflation and never-ending shortages in the Soviet 
economy.  The Soviet government first instituted price controls in the late 1920s, and the results 
were usually the same ever since.  State stores and co-operates that sold goods at official prices 
usually had shortages, and consumers were unable to find the products they wanted.  However, 
even the official stores continued to have open inflation until the end of the Second World War, 
due to excess wage payments and production plans that ignored consumer goods.  In 1947, a 
currency reform eliminated both open and repressed inflation and temporarily reversed the 
previous inflationary pressures.  However, wages again began to be increased more than 
productivity gains, and central planners resuming ignoring consumer needs.  As repressed 
inflation increased, shortages became pervasive and workers saved more of their incomes.  Many 
items that were ubiquitous in the West were virtually unavailable in the Soviet Union, and the 
standard of living in general was much lower.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RUSSIA‟S SECOND HYPERINFLATION 
 
Mikhail Gorbachev‟s economic reforms of the late 1980s, known as perestroika, and the 
hyperinflation that followed in the early 1990s were traumatic events for former Soviet citizens 
and contributed to a growing skepticism about the desirability of a free markets and democracy.  
Initially, much of the Soviet population supported perestroika and hoped that it would solve 
communism‟s problems, such as persistent shortages and general poverty compared to the West.  
Indeed, Gorbachev‟s reforms were intended to increase economic growth and improve the supply 
of consumer goods, but the results were the exact opposite.  Inflation and declining output made 
shortages even more acute, and the Soviet public suffered even more than they had during the 
previous decades of communism.  Hyperinflation also caused real incomes to drop, wiped out 
life savings, and made food very difficult to find.  Although it was caused by the legacy of 
communism, hyperinflation occurred during the first several years of capitalism and democracy, 
creating a negative first impression of these social systems.  These years, the early 1990s, 
brought prosperity only to the very few, while the vast majority experienced poverty, chaos, and 
immense hardship.  This has led many of inflation‟s victims to desire stability, even if it means a 
partial return to authoritarian politics and a managed economy. 
Perestroika 
By the time Gorbachev came to power, most Soviet citizens agreed that the economy had 
problems and needed some sort of change in order to improve.  They could see that labor often 
went to waste, the supply of goods had hardly changed in many years, and there was little visible 
improvement in little standards.1  While this was apparent to the general populace, Gorbachev 
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was the first Soviet leader to publicly admit that central planning was not working and suggest 
trying something different.    Almost immediately after becoming General Secretary, Gorbachev 
began to speak about the need to improve the supply of consumer goods and agricultural 
products.  The previous leaders that followed Stalin had also made some efforts to improve 
agriculture and consumption, but Gorbachev could see that these efforts had been largely 
insufficient.  He was more honest about the depth of the problems than his predecessors had been 
and placed greater emphasis on the need for change.  Gorbachev argued that the economy was 
wasteful and inefficient, and if it continued along the same track, the promise of socialism would 
never be fulfilled.  The economy had been virtually stagnant for over a decade and was falling 
further behind the West, so Gorbachev feared that simply maintaining the status quo could lead 
to the Soviet Union facing worker revolts, as Poland had in 1980, and losing its superpower 
status.2 
Soviet citizens already knew that the economy was in bad shape, but they hoped that 
Gorbachev‟s frank assessment of the situation and commitment to fixing it would bring real 
improvement.  Before Gorbachev, the Soviet government was not exactly known for its honesty 
in reporting the shortcomings of communism and tried to censor any information that did so.  
Nevertheless, shortages were obvious for Soviet consumers and were the subject of the famously 
cynical Soviet political humor.  Earlier in the post-war era, people living in the Soviet Union at 
least saw gradual improvement every year, but since the Era of Stagnation began around 1975, it 
was difficult to even have hope for the future.  When Gorbachev admitted that the economy was 
failing and needed restructuring, they were more surprised by their leader‟s honesty than his 
message.  Few still believed in the lofty visions of communism that had been promised by Marx 
and Lenin, but many did accept the notion that Gorbachev could at least improve their society, 
61 
 
including the supply of goods and services.  A Soviet sociologist reported that between 35 and 
43 percent of the population supported perestroika from 1985 to 1987, while a poll by two major 
American news agencies found a much higher 73 percent in favor in 1988.3 
After raising hopes for significant positive change, Gorbachev‟s actual reforms managed 
to be both timid and deleterious.  In the early years of perestroika, Gorbachev did not have a 
specific strategy in mind, and his early measures were quite traditional.  In an effort to improve 
labor discipline and raise productivity, Gorbachev tried to drastically restrict the production and 
consumption of alcohol.  Like many of his measures, the anti-alcohol campaign had good 
intentions and reasons behind it but turned out to be highly unpopular and ineffective.  The 
Russian imperial government had attempted a similar policy during the First World War, and the 
results were the same in both cases:  budget deficits increased due to a loss of sales tax revenue, 
while Russians continued to drink homemade moonshine, known as samogon.  Gorbachev‟s 
second early policy was uskorenie, or acceleration, which raised investment spending on new 
technologies to try to accelerate growth.  In practice, much of this new investment went into the 
defense sector, while the priority of agriculture and consumption was downgraded to 
compensate.  Obviously, this did little to benefit consumers and it also failed to increase overall 
growth.  Meanwhile, both of these policies contributed to growing budget deficits, which were 
one of the main causes of inflation.4 
The reforms of the middle period (1987-1988) initiated the growth of inflation and the 
collapse of the command economy.  Gorbachev and other top officials were still not ready to 
consider creating markets or private property, but they took some measures to decentralize 
decision making, legalize unplanned activity, and increase trade with the world.  However, these 
halfway measures only created more problems.  They relaxed some of the central controls over 
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the economy, but in such a way that caused the breakdown of the socialist system without 
replacing it with a functioning market.  The most important reform in this period was the law on 
state enterprises, passed in 1987.  The intent of the law was to make enterprises responsible for 
their own management and finances, but in practice, the central government continued to both 
control many of their decisions and subsidize their accounts.  Thus, the reform did nothing to 
address the old problems of shortages and soft budget constraints.  Enterprises did get more 
freedom over their decisions, but this did more harm than good because they continued to get 
bailed out when they ran losses.5 
Decentralization gave enterprises more power to determine production plans, wages, and 
prices, and it allowed them to shift balances from input accounts that were previously eliminated 
annually.   This essentially monetized the production sector, whose contributions to the money 
supply were previously limited to just wage payments.  Under these conditions, competition and 
efficiency did not improve.  Since their inputs remained free, enterprises tended to raise wages 
more than was justified by additional production, “contrary to declared government policy.”  
This was also an old problem, but Gorbachev‟s reforms only made it worse.  Enterprises were 
able to increase profits simply by increasing prices within set limits.  However, due to the nature 
of the system, some of these price increases were ultimately paid for by the state, which further 
contributed to monetary expansion.  Since wages and prices were both increased without an 
accompanying increase in production, this only created inflation without alleviating shortages.6  
Finally, Gorbachev's reform also created greater shortages by allowing enterprises to “siphon” 
goods off the consumer market with their spare funds.7   
Another important law from the middle period was the law on cooperatives from 1988, 
which essentially legalized private enterprise within certain parameters.  The existing state 
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enterprises and newly legalized cooperatives and banks were given just enough freedom to act 
outside of the planned system, but not enough to do so in a way that was economically healthy.  
The cooperatives and banks were essentially private companies, but in practice, they were often 
connected to state enterprises.  The inputs for enterprises were still financed by the state, but 
their managers were able to move these funds through the less regulated banks and cooperatives 
to accumulate personal profit.  For instance, an enterprise could get easy credit from an affiliated 
bank and use it to pay a family member‟s cooperative for bogus services; or they could sell state-
provided goods to the cooperative at the low official price, and the cooperative was then free to 
raise prices and resell the goods.  The involved parties would share the profits, which came at the 
expense of the state budget.8 
During Gorbachev‟s tenure, state budget deficits spiraled out of control and were 
financed largely by monetary emissions.  The state budget had always played a huge role in the 
Soviet economy and was responsible for distributing about 60 percent of national income.  
Budgets started growing since the early 1970s, and many sources suggest that deficits probably 
existed even earlier, although official Soviet records only admit deficits after 1985.  Since 1968, 
the State Bank covered budget deficits with credits, which were never paid off.  Instead, the bank 
covered the shortfall by printing new rubles, which contributed created inflationary pressure.  
However, as Gur Ofer shows, deficits only became a serious problem after Gorbachev‟s reforms.  
In the early 1980s, the budget deficit was a manageable 2 percent of GDP, but by 1989, it had 
grown to about 11 percent.  By the end of 1991, the Soviet budget deficit had reached an 
estimated 20 percent.  Likewise, the amount of money printed to cover the deficit rose sharply 
after 1985.  However, since prices remained controlled, most of the new money printed simply 
accumulated in bank accounts and did not create much open inflation.  From 1987 to 1991, total 
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bank deposits remained about 7 or 8 times higher than money in circulation, an excess known as 
monetary overhang.9 
Table 11. Indicators of Money Supply and Overhang, 1987-1991  
(in billions of rubles as of January 1st, except where noted) 
Year 
Money in 
Circulation (a) 
Total Bank 
Deposits (b) 
Overhang 
Indicator (b/a) 
1987 74.8 593.2 7.93 
1988 80.6 631.6 7.83 
1989 91.6 702.6 7.67 
1990 109.5 781.2 7.13 
1991 136.1 944.6 6.94 
July 1, 1991 157.6 1325.5 8.41 
Source: Filatochev and Bradshaw, 742. 
Several factors combined to cause the growing deficits during the Gorbachev years.  Total 
revenue fell from reduced production and efficiency.  Gorbachev‟s anti-alcohol campaign failed 
to produce the desired increase in productivity, while cutting alcohol‟s share of budget revenue 
from 12-14 percent down to 3.5 percent.  As far as external factors, the fall of oil prices and 
production in the mid-1980s caused export revenue to decline.  After 1987, the state cut spending 
on investment from about 20 percent of GNP to 13 percent, but the accompanying decline in 
revenue from profit taxes nearly canceled out the budget cut.  According to official figures, 
defense spending fell from about 9 percent of GNP in the 1980s to 7.5 percent in 1990. Other 
estimates, such as that of Philip Hanson, put the share of defense spending in GNP as high as 17 
percent, although they also agreed that the percentage was shrinking.  Social welfare spending, 
however, increased slightly from 14 percent, a major part of which was price subsidies.10 
Retail price subsidies were a major cause of the Soviet budget deficit and repressed 
inflation.  The government maintained the retail subsidies instituted in 1965, and food prices 
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remained almost unchanged by the late 1980s.  As a result, the share of the true price paid by 
consumers continuously declined, from 50-80 percent in 1970 to 25-40 percent in the late 1980s.  
The remainder of the price was paid by the state, so the portion of the budget spent on subsidies 
went from 4 percent to 20 percent in the late 1980s.  This amounted to 11-15 percent of total 
national income.  The effects of continuing budget subsidies mounted:  savings accumulated, 
shortages continued, market disequilibrium worsened, and the budget deficit increased.  After 
stabilizing at around 4 percent in the 1970s and early 1980s, the deficit accounted for 10 percent 
of the budget in the middle of the decade and reached 18-19 percent by 1988-9.  Although 
several other aforementioned factors contributed to the deficit as well, Byung-Yeon Kim argues 
that “one of the most important was subsidy expenditure.”  The policy was also partly 
responsible for the decline in revenue, since more taxes on turnover and profits would have been 
collected from higher priced goods.11 
In light of price subsidies and other factors, internal and external, the Soviet budget 
situation became dire in the late 1980s. Because the state used more of its resources for 
consumption, less of the budget went toward investment and the creation of new wealth, which 
was supposed to be one of its main functions according to the central planning model.  Whereas 
expenditure on investment stood at 10.3 percent of the GDP and subsidies at 5.8 percent from 
1971-75, these respectively halved and doubled to 5.3 percent for investment and 12 percent for 
subsidies in the 1990 plan.12  This caused economic growth to slow and taxable activity to 
decline.  As state revenue failed to even finance its own consumption, “the Soviet system almost 
ceased to function after 1988.”  Thus, price subsidies had hurt the economy not only by adding to 
budget expenditure, but also by indirectly decreasing revenue.  The destabilization of the 
consumer market and the rate of repressed inflation also accelerated, because the amount of 
66 
 
money printed to cover the deficit soared after 1985.  Buyng-Yeon Kim concludes, the “sharp 
increase in printing money in the late 1980s suggests that the Soviet economy was then on the 
verge of collapse.”13 
 
Source: Kim, 121. 
Inflation and Collapse 
Inflation began to spiral out of control in the early 1990s as the government started 
raising both prices and wages.  The cause of the shortages to begin with was that consumer 
purchasing power was higher than the supply of goods.  In a market economy, rising demand 
leads to price increases and a greater quantity of goods being sold.  In the Soviet Union, prices 
remained fixed for most of the post-war era, even as the population and their wages grew.  This 
should have led to price increases, but instead the inflation was repressed, so store shelves 
remained empty, while workers‟ savings grew.  Freeing prices would have allowed the consumer 
market to balance, albeit by causing open inflation.  The Soviet leaders knew that prices were too 
low but felt that simply releasing controls would be politically dangerous.  Their preferred 
67 
 
approach was to raise prices by fiat rather than letting them be set by market pressures.  
However, they felt that it was necessary to compensate for the increases by also raising wages 
and pensions.  This policy made good sense politically, but the results were economically 
disastrous.  Since both incomes and prices increased, there was no incentive for producers to 
increase their output and shortages persisted.  Moreover, price increases went into effect first, 
while the compensation that was promised often took longer to arrive.  This left many people 
simultaneously facing shortages, inflation, and lower real incomes.14 
Instead of alleviating the shortages, Gorbachev‟s policies made them intolerable.  As 
described previously, shortages were a result of central planning and were already a major 
nuisance long before Gorbachev came to power and started tinkering with the system.  The great 
irony was that he correctly identified this problem, but his attempted solutions made it so much 
worse.  In 1989, the supply of consumer goods was no longer just growing slower than workers‟ 
incomes but actually lower than the previous year in absolute terms.  Production of numerous 
durable goods, including furniture and various home appliances, fell far short of the planned 
goals.  As domestic production fell, imports of consumer goods were also reduced by 9 billion 
rubles between 1986 and 1988.  By 1991, only twenty out of 1,100 categories of consumer goods 
were “routinely available.”  The most alarming new shortages reported were of soap, laundry 
powder, and toothpaste.15   
In the case of the food supply, the collective farms had always been inefficient, and much 
of their product rotted before it made it to store shelves due to problems with collection, storage, 
and transportation.  This issue was exacerbated by perestroika.  Soviet harvests relied largely on 
the extra labor of urban workers and professionals being sent out from enterprises to help collect 
the crop at the appropriate time.  This practice was unpopular but necessary in the context of the 
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Soviet system.  After Gorbachev loosened the grip of central control, enterprises began refusing 
to send their workers out to the fields, and the harvest suffered as a result.  Agricultural 
authorities then retaliated by refusing to send whatever crops they did collect to the cities that 
failed to help with the harvest.  This type of selfish behavior became part of a general pattern in 
the Gorbachev era.16   
As shortages worsened and the command hierarchy fell apart, the political and economic 
components of the Soviet Union became antagonistic towards each other and ceased to function 
effectively as a unit.  From individuals to republics, everyone started trying to look out for their 
own and hoarding whatever food, goods, and cash they could find.  While shortages had always 
existed, hoarding was a new development.  Previously, people at least felt comfortable that a 
minimum supply of food would always be there, even if the selection was poor or they had to 
wait in line.  With perestroika, they were no longer sure that stores would have food in the near 
future, and if they did, the prices would probably be higher by then.  People also hoarded 
consumer goods, either to save for personal future use or in an effort to buy anything available 
and resell it for profit.17 
  Public hoarding was even more extensive than hoarding by individuals.  Republics, 
cities, enterprises, and other groups tried to take care of their own constituents by turning to 
protectionist policies, but this instead only exacerbated the situation for everyone.  Enterprises 
started refusing to fulfill contracts to deliver necessary inputs to others producers, which 
obviously hampered their output.  In 1989, the Moscow city government ordered stores to start 
checking passports and only allow residents of Moscow or the surrounding oblast to purchase 
food.  In retaliation, surrounding cities stopped delivering supplies to Moscow and started using 
their own rationing systems.  Rationing spread to Leningrad and other cities across Russia in 
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1990.  Perhaps most damaging to the Soviet Union as a whole was the introduction of 
protectionist policies by the member republics.  In late 1990, Ukraine completely stopped 
exporting agricultural products to Russia and started issuing coupons to its citizens so only they 
could buy goods in Ukraine.  The rest of the republics also started acting independently around 
this time and contributed as little tax revenue and resources to the center as possible.  Again, the 
logic behind their policies is understandable, but the effect was to worsen the economic disaster.  
Protectionism created a breakdown in trade, which only made shortages worse everywhere.  
When the union government did not receive the expected revenue contributions from the 
republics, its budget deficits grew much faster than they already had been.  The deficits were 
covered by simply printing more money, which became an immediate cause of hyperinflation.18 
In the early 1990s, the collapse became imminent.  In 1990 and 1991, shortfalls in the 
budget got much worse than they had even been in the late 1980s.  Government revenue covered 
only 36 percent of planned expenditure in the first quarter of 1991, leaving a gap of 27 billion 
rubles that had to be financed by an increase in the money supply.  Falling production and 
increased spending on social welfare were responsible for much of the discrepancy.  Gross 
national product fell by 2 percent in 1990 and 13 percent in 1991.  Foreign trade revenue also 
declined, with 1991 exports falling by 33 percent and imports by 45 percent.  Yet the biggest 
problem came from the loss of control over the member republics, as they transferred only about 
half of their agreed contributions to the central budget.  It was unclear how high the deficits 
actually got, but some estimated the deficits of 1990 and 1991 to be around 200 billion rubles.  
The enormous deficits were monetized and total bank deposits were over 1.3 trillion rubles in 
1991, despite only 157.6 billion in circulation.19   
The bloated money supply and the huge gap between supply and demand finally led to 
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open inflation and widespread shortages.  Official inflation was measured at 5.3 percent in 1990, 
but the freely set prices on the farmers‟ markets showed inflation of 29 percent.  Despite barely 
raising official prices, the Soviet state apparently realized that its currency was rapidly losing 
value, because ruble-to-dollar exchange rates increased at similar rates on the black market and 
at state auctions.  The ruble steadily depreciated throughout 1990, and by the end of the year, 
black market prices were three to four times higher, on average, than official rates.  On the first 
day of 1991, some prices were finally raised or even liberalized, but many remained fixed or 
regulated.  Open inflation reached about 20 percent in 1990 and 200 percent by 1991.  Yet, 
despite the price rises, shortages actually got worse in 1991 than they were in 1990.  This 
occurred because the increases were not sufficient to balance supply and demand, but they did 
unleash the repressed inflation that been building for decades.  In addition, the level of supply 
dropped as enterprises reduced output and fewer imports came in.20 
Table 12.  Inflation in the Soviet Union or Russian Federation, 1985-1995 
Year 
Official Figure 
(percent) 
Highest Estimate 
(percent) 
1985 1.0 4.6 
1986 2.0 - 
1987 1.3 - 
1988 0.6 6 
1989 2.0 8 
1990 5.3 20 
1991 96.3 200 
1992 - 2318 
1993 - 841 
1994 - 205 
1995 - 131 
Sources: Shleifer and Vishny, 344; Filatochev and Bradshaw, 739;  
Fischer and Frenkel, 39; Hedlund and Sundström, 893. 
As repressed inflation became open and shortages worsened, the Soviet economy almost 
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ceased to function.  Real income decreased due to the falling value of the ruble, but buying 
necessities depended more on finding them rather than affording them.  According to one 
estimate, “30 million man-years [were] spent in queues annually—about 25 percent of the 
waking time of every adult.”21  Consumers had more incentive to look for goods than to work 
more, so aggregate labor supply decreased.  Money lost its function as a store of value, so 
consumers began hoarding durables and dollars, while firms hoarded their inputs instead of 
producing.  The latter phenomenon was particularly damaging to the economy, because it led to a 
drop in output and further shortages.  Because many prices remained fixed, many producers 
chose to not honor their contracts with state enterprises and instead sold their output to higher-
paying customers.  In the absence of a properly functioning currency, bartering and theft also 
developed.  Shleifer and Vishny concluded that “the collapse of the Soviet economy is at least in 
part explained buy the breakdown of traditional coordination channels and the resulting diversion 
of labor and inputs.”22 
As the Soviet Union disintegrated, inflation became a regional issue, and the former 
republics had to deal with their own economic problems.  They had to establish their own 
functioning governments to replace the central control from Moscow.  The Central Bank of the 
USSR dissolved, and the individual republics became responsible for issuing rubles.  Anders 
Åslund argues that one of the main causes of the hyperinflation was maintaining the ruble zone 
for a year and a half too long.  By late 1990, the Soviet Union had ceased to function because the 
member republics stopped contributing to the central budget.  Instead, the former republics were 
each left with their own deficits, which they all financed with by issuing rubles from their own 
central banks.  This led to even faster inflation due to different banks issuing the same currency 
without any coordination.  In 1992, several of the successor states began issuing their own paper 
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moneys, usually known as coupons, to get away from the depreciating ruble.23  However, these 
coupons suffered from their own hyperinflations soon after being issued and were eventually 
replaced by other national currencies.* 
On January 2nd, 1992, Russia finally liberalized most prices, with only a few controls 
remaining.  Resulting price increases were very large that month, 382 percent for producers and 
296 for consumers, largely due to all the existing monetary overhang and inflationary 
expectations.  In other words, people expected prices to go up as soon as they were freed and 
rushed to spend the money that had been printed and languished in bank accounts unspent.  This 
caused velocity to go up, and inflation continued at a rapid pace, reaching a staggering 2,318 
percent by the end of the year.  The macroeconomic effect of inflation was a shortening of the 
time horizon for economic decision making.  With money losing its value so quickly, people 
were reluctant to make long-term contracts, and investment in the Russian economy fell by more 
than 60 percent from 1992 to 1994.24 
Discussion 
The situation got so bad because Soviet authorities refused to recognize and properly deal 
with the problem of repressed inflation earlier.  Decades before the collapse, both Western and 
Soviet economists realized that the Soviet economy was not immune to inflation.  In 1985, Igor 
Birman and Roger A. Clarke wrote that the problem of the money supply was getting worse in 
the Soviet Union and needed to be dealt with eventually.  They suggested four ideas that could 
have potentially fixed the issue:  “(1) A drastic cut in military expenditure” would have freed up 
                                                                 
*
 According to one family anecdote,  people in Ukraine were trading a kilogram of coupons for a kilogram of bread 
in the early 1990s.  Issues of Ekonomika i Zhizn’ from 1992 have stories of people using suitcases to carry cash and 
political cartoons depicting absurdly large bags used as wallets, so there may be some truth to such stories. 
(Ekonomika i Zhizn, No. 7, p. 3; No. 10, p. 9; No. 21, p. 2). 
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resources to produce consumer goods but was unlikely.  “(2) A radical economic reform in 
industry and/or agriculture” could have increased economic performance, but was not a solution 
as long as the population had no reason to earn more money.  “(3) A sharp increase in retail 
prices” certainly could have restored equilibrium between supply and demand, but would have 
caused “severe discontent” unless done very carefully “with compensating wage increases.”  
Finally, “(4) some kind of monetary reform designed to destroy most of the accumulated 
savings” could have eliminated the overhang without causing inflation, but would have been 
difficult to explain politically.25 
During the reform debates of the late 1980s, Gorbachev was willing to listen to any 
viewpoints, “as long as they were socialist.”26  He considered a limited private sector to be 
desirable, but was very reluctant to accept any form of radical marketization.  Many reformers 
accepted the idea of decontrolling prices, but the greater question of creating market institutions 
that allow supply and demand to function remained unanswered.  To judge Gorbachev by Birman 
and Clarke‟s four ideas, he attempted the first three inadequately and did not try the fourth.  
Military spending was cut by 1.5 percent of the GDP, but this did not alleviate shortages on the 
consumer market.  Enterprises were partially liberalized, but as described earlier, this added more 
to the money supply than to production.  Prices and wages were finally raised in the early 1990s, 
but again, the increases released inflation without being sufficient to balance supply and demand.  
Valentin Pavlov, the last Soviet prime minister attempted a monetary confiscation in early 1991, 
but it was vastly inadequate.  Gorbachev cannot be blamed for creating disequilibrium and 
repressed inflation in the Soviet economy, but his reforms made the problems that he inherited 
worse instead of better.27 
Economists differ about whether the Soviet Union should have reformed gradually or 
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quickly in the early 1990s.  In 1990, Gur Ofer argued against a quick, “big bang” approach.  
Because liberalizing prices and marketizing the economy would certainly lead to open inflation, 
he suggested that prices should be revised and the budget deficit reduced first.  The Soviet Union 
also lacked the proper institutions and infrastructure for a functioning market economy.  Thus, 
rapid marketization would lead not only to high inflation, but enterprises would also fail to 
operate under market conditions.  Ofer‟s theory was that stabilization should come before market 
reforms.  The primary step necessary to balance the budget would have been to eliminate price 
subsidies and devalue the ruble, along with confiscating existing real balances and reducing real 
incomes.  However, Ofer realized that a price revision would have certainly been difficult.  The 
idea would have been “widely resisted on political and social grounds” and would have 
“impose[d] an immediate and sizeable burden on most of the population.” 28   
Given the circumstances in late 1991, Anders Åslund argues that a rapid transformation 
was the best option.  According to Åslund, it is politically easier to pass a large package of 
reforms all at once, while it is clear that there is a crisis that needs to be fixed.  He also suggests 
that a “comprehensive and consistent” reform package is more effective.  In Russia, it was 
necessary to break inflationary expectations and force the rent-seeking managerial elite to 
respond to market forces, namely consumer demand.  This could only occur if “a strict budgetary 
and monetary policy” were quickly implemented.  In sum, the more rapid and radical the market 
reforms, the sooner the distortions and corruption of the old system would be eliminated.29  He 
also rejects the notion that the Soviet Union dissolved too quickly, arguing that maintaining the 
ruble zone a year and a half too long led to hyperinflation.30 
After the Soviet Union finally fell, triple-digit inflation was running rampant and the 
population was near starvation, so authorities had to act quickly.31  Economists do agree that the 
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government should have reduced its deficit and the monetary overhang before liberalizing 
prices.32  However, Fischer and Frenkel assert that this choice was not available in 1992.  The 
Russian budget deficit stood at 20 percent of GNP, and it had no “external resources [available] 
to help finance the budget and stabilize the currency.”  In that circumstance, “the choice was 
between (a) liberalizing prices and risking hyperinflation and (b) maintaining price controls with 
the consequence of growing shortages.”  A growing number of transactions were occurring on 
the black market anyway, so the choice was essentially between hidden and open inflation.  With 
no time for gradual reform due to the rapidly collapsing system, policymakers chose to go with 
“shock treatment” or the “Big Bang” approach.  The transition to a market economy was 
expected to be painful, so the point of shock therapy was the get the pain over quickly.33   
Hedlund and Sundström instead suggest that currency reform was possible and should 
have been enacted.  A majority of the overhang was due to money that was printed in 1991.  
According to these two authors, the printing presses created more money in that year alone than 
in the previous 30 years, 137.8 billion in 1991 compared to 133.8 billion from 1961-1990.  They 
blame Yeltsin for promising substantial benefits to the population, in the midst of his power 
struggle with Gorbachev, with no way to pay his promises other than money creation.  Yeltsin‟s 
camp moved to control the Russian central bank, which financed the Russian Federation‟s 1991 
budget deficit that was equivalent to a ridiculous 31.9 percent of its GDP.  The overhang created 
by this expansion in the money supply could have been eliminated by currency reform.  Hedlund 
and Sundström agree with Ofer that currency reform would have been politically difficult, but 
suggest that it was possible in the context of shock therapy, rather than gradual reform.  Not only 
would it have made economic sense, but could have also been done in politically palatable way 
“by introducing graduated rights for the changing of old rubles into new currency.”  They find it 
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strange that Russia did so little counteract inflation.34  This counters Fischer and Frenkel‟s idea 
that the authorities had no choice but to let hyperinflation happen.35 
Stabilization 
High inflation continued in Russia until 1995, as several attempts to stabilize the ruble 
failed.  The first attempt was in early 1992, when Egor Gaidar instituted his shock therapy 
reforms, rapidly privatizing the economy and cutting the budget deficit.  Thus, monetization of 
deficits became less of a factor in causing inflation.  However, the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) 
continued far more to the money supply by granting credits to commercial banks.  These credits 
totaled 457 billion rubles in just the first half of 1992, which was almost equivalent to the 
monetary base at the beginning of the year. Viktor Gerashchenko, the former head of the Soviet 
State Bank, became head of the CBR in July 1992 and continued granting credits to agriculture, 
industry, and the budgets of Russia and the former Soviet republics.  After a decline from the 
peak in January, inflation began rising against after July.  In mid-1993, finance minister Boris 
Fyodorov negotiated an agreement with the CBR to limit how much credit it granted, but the 
central bank broke the agreement and continued granting excessive credit due to lobbying 
pressure.  This lead to another increase in the inflation rate in January 1994.  This situation 
repeated itself again in a third stabilization attempt in 1994, in which credit was temporarily 
tightened, then expanded again.36 
 The ruble was finally stabilized in 1995 when the Russian government and the CBR 
found a way to bring profits to commercial banks without creating inflation.  Throughout the first 
half of the 1990s, commercial banks and enterprises profited from inflation and lobbied the 
government and the central bank to keep credit rolling.  As Austrian economist Murray Rothbard 
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has argued, those who receive newly printed money first see the most benefit because they use it 
before it inflates.  People who receive the money last have the most to lose, because it has lost its 
value by the time it gets to them.  Thus, Russian commercial banks were able to receive credit at 
low or negative real interest rates.  In return, the banks funded the election campaigns of Russian 
politicians, or conversely, threatened to slow down the economy if their credits stopped.  In May 
1993, the Finance Ministry started offering short term government securities (GKOs) with rates 
that were significantly higher than inflation, and the profits off GKOs were tax free.  After late 
1994, banks started investing more heavily in GKOs and were able to make profits that 
compensated for what they lost from the curtailment of central bank credit.  Since the banks were 
now lending to the state at fixed interest rates, inflation was no longer in their self-interest.  
Finally, the government also made a deal with crucial enterprises, especially in the energy sector, 
which had also been recipients of credit.  The fuel and electricity sectors agreed to continue 
supplying their products without requiring additional payment from the budget in exchange for 
toleration of their past and present tax arrears.37 
 With the pro-inflation lobby happy and paid-off, the Russian government and central 
bank were able to make several changes to ensure that inflation remained low.  Reserve 
requirements for commercial banks were more than double from January to August of 1995.  
Real interest rates went up to 35 percent in 1995, and as explained, central bank credits to private 
banks and enterprises significantly decreased.  The central bank also stopped granting credit to 
the government for its budget deficits.  Instead, the sale of the new securities and foreign 
borrowing helped to pay for the deficit and reducing the need to new money creation.  The 
government almost managed to reduce the deficit overall, down to manageable 2.9 percent of 
GDP in 1995.  Stabilization did not lead to a noticeable increase in unemployment, which 
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remained around 9 percent.  The decline in GDP, which had been in double digits from 1992 to 
1994, improved to negative 4 percent in 1995 and 1996, before eking into positive territory in 
1997.38 
 
Source: Daniel S. Treisman, “Fighting Inflation in a Transitional Regime: Russia‟s Anomalous  
Stabilization,” World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Jan., 1998): 243. 
Social Effects 
Inflation led to a precipitous drop in living standards in the early 1990s.  Nominal 
incomes went up as they chased after rising prices but only compensated for about 80 percent of 
the increased costs.  In other words, inflation caused real incomes to decrease by around 20 
percent.  The existence of poverty was never acknowledged in the Soviet Union before 
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Gorbachev‟s time and remained difficult to estimate.  By the most reasonable consensus, it 
appears that about one-third of the Soviet population, or almost 100 million people, was below 
the poverty line in 1991.  The drop in standard of living was worse in some regions than others.  
The largest cities, Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Kiev, had the highest inflation rates and resulting 
decreases in real incomes: 31 percent in Moscow, 24 percent in Kiev, and 20 percent in St. 
Petersburg.  The Central Asian republics were also hit harder by inflation than the Slavic ones.  
Large families, which were mostly in Central Asia, found it very difficult to feed all of their 
children in the wake of rising prices and very meager state assistance.  In the three main Slavic 
republics, eleven percent or less lived below the poverty line, compared to a staggering half or 
more of the people in Central Asia.39 
Inflation also disproportionally hurt some groups, such as women and the elderly, and 
wiped out everyone‟s life savings, while the rich were only ones to benefit.  Even before the 
collapse, most women earned far lower salaries than men, and the further reduction in real 
incomes made life even harder for time.  Retirees relied on fixed monthly pensions that lagged 
even further behind inflation than workers‟ incomes, and worse still, the checks were not 
delivered at all for months at a time during the crisis.  Hyperinflation also destroyed life savings 
on which workers and retirees hoped they could depend.  For example, one college-educated 
woman had earned a monthly salary of 120 rubles and saved 10 rubles a month for many years to 
amass 3000 rubles in savings by the early 1990s.  Hyperinflation made this considerable sum 
worth the equivalent of 3 rubles.†40  Those who benefited from inflation were the “„new 
Russians‟, i.e. people who operate at or beyond the outer limits of law and common decency.”41  
Average real wages for most groups fell four years in a row, from 1992 to 1995.  However, the 
                                                                 
†
 This was made official in 1998, when the ruble was revalued at a ratio of 1000 to 1. 
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richest 20 percent were the only group to increase their incomes, showing growing inequality.  
Average Russians now resent the newly rich oligarchs as thieves who gained their wealth by 
stealing from state enterprises.42 
Perestroika and inflation also led to “the first sustained food crisis since World War II."43  
This was nothing approaching another famine, but food became more expensive and difficult to 
find, and the quality of diets dropped.  Large cities and the Central Asian republics were also hit 
harder by food shortages.  The cities relied on deliveries from the provinces, which stopped 
showing up due to the separatism and hoarding described earlier.  In 1989, Moscow already 
reported that many stores had no meat at all, and most other foods were also in shortage.  Per 
capita consumption of potatoes, fruits, and vegetables was lower in Moscow in 1985 than it was 
1980, and dropped even lower in 1989. Citizens of Leningrad were particularly troubled by the 
new food shortages, as they remembered the million deaths from starvation during the Second 
World War.  Due to rising inflation, the percentage of household incomes spent on food 
increased by 6 percent in 1991 over 1990, yet the quantity and quality of the food available both 
declined.  The overall daily caloric ration dropped by 10 percent, largely because consumption of 
meat, milk, butter, and eggs fell even farther.  People were forced to compensate by eating more 
carbohydrates, such as bread, potatoes, and sugar.  Worse still, the citizens of Turkmenistan, 
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan ate less of not just animal products but even the starchy foods.  The 
food crisis had damaging effects on the health of Soviet citizens and may have been responsible 
for the falling birth rate and rising death rate in 1991.44 
As shown in the following chart, food production in Russia continued to drop 
precipitously after 1991.  Although overall caloric intake stabilized after 1992, due to increased 
imports and production from private gardens, Russians have a number of complaints about the 
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post-Soviet food supply.  At the height of the inflationary crisis, huge crowds gathered to 
purchase any type of meat being offered, and people had to grab whatever they could before 
being shoved out of the way.  Throughout the 1990s, Russians continued to get less of their daily 
Table 13. Food Production in Russia per Year Compared to Previous Years, 1991-1995 
Food category 
(in tons, unless 
otherwise noted) 
1991 
1991 as 
a % of 
1990 
1992 
1992 as 
a % of 
1991 
1994 as 
a % of 
1993 
1995 
1995 as 
a % of 
1994 
1995 as 
a % of 
1991 
Total food 
production 
- 91 - 85 - - -  
Meat (mil.) 5.6 84 4.4 76 75 2.5 76 44.6 
Sausage products 
(mil.) 
2.1 91 1.5 73 102 1.27 82 60.5 
Milk products 
(mil.) 
18.5 89 9.5 51 83 5.4 76 29.2 
Animal fats (thou.) 724 87 746 103 67 419 86 57.9 
Cheese (thou.) 394 86 295 75 89 217 76 55.1 
Fish and fish 
products (mil.) 
3.8 89 3.1 83 78 1.6 108 42.1 
Margarine (thou.) 627 78 560 89 - - -  
Vegetable oil 
(thou.) 
1149 99.2 954 82 76 773 85 67.3 
Sugar (mil.) 3.1 87 3.9 114 69 3.1 115 100 
Bread and bakery 
products (mil.) 
19 104 16.9 89 82 10.9 88 57.4 
Confectionary 
products (mil.) 
2.6 92 1.8 69 - - -  
Flour (mil.) 20.7 99.8 19.9 97 87 14 88 67.6 
Groats (mil.) 2.7 93 1.9 71 71 1.4 90 51.2 
Macaroni products 
(thou.) 
113 107 1.1 99 - - -  
Preserves (mil. 
cans) 
7.0 85 5.3 77 - - -  
Alcohol (mil. 
decaliters) 
82.2 104 76.3 92 78 122 98 117 
Note: The economic facts published for 1993 did not include detailed food production statistics but did 
note that purchases of meat products, sugar, and vegetable oil grew from 12 to 26 percent, and purchases 
of milk products by 6 percent, as the population adapted to “unorganized” food trade.  Production 
statistics for 1994 also unavailable. 
Source: Ekonomika i Zhizn’ (1992, no. 4; 1993, no. 4; 1994, no. 8; 1996, no. 6). 
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caloric intake from meat and milk products and more from starchy foods such as bread and 
potatoes.  According to conventional dietary advice, this has actually been good for their health, 
since animal fats are blamed for cardiovascular diseases.  However, iron deficiencies, diabetes, 
and obesity are also cited as some of the main nutrition- linked health problems in Russia.   Iron 
is most readily available in red meat and other animal sources, a lack of which in the diet can 
lead to an iron deficiency.  A growing number of nutrition experts also caution against excessive 
carbohydrate intake and blame high incidences of obesity and diabetes on the consumption of too 
many sugary and starchy foods.  Perhaps the most serious dietary imbalance in the 1990s was 
that only 3 or 4 percent of Russian caloric intake came from fruits and vegetables, which all 
health experts would agree is far too low.  Now, there is a wide variety of meats and produce 
offered in stores, but Russians complain that most of it comes from far away and has numerous 
additives that were not used in Soviet times.45 
Political Effects 
As the problems of the Soviet Union became readily apparent to its population, they 
became angry but were not sure whom or what to blame.  Initially, it seemed like the problem 
was communism, which never lived up to its promise and could not match the prosperity of the 
capitalist West.   By its last few years, very few people in the Soviet Union cared about 
Marxism-Leninism.46  However, when Gorbachev started chipping away at central planning, the 
economy suddenly became much worse than it had been for the previous several decades.  If 
nothing else, the post-war Soviet economy was stable, and it managed to consistently provide a 
minimum of comfort.  Perestroika took away even this guaranteed minimum.  When prices 
remained steady, there were always shortages, but when the prices started to rise, shortages got 
worse and everything became harder to afford.  Many blamed Gorbachev and the central 
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government for the general failure of the economy, but shop managers who raised prices were 
also treated with hostility.  According to William Moskoff, inflation hurt the Soviet people‟s 
confidence in economic freedom.47  After all, Gorbachev had allowed them some freedoms, and 
the result was economic collapse and widespread misery for most people.  This made the Soviet 
population ambivalent about whether communism or capitalism was the right answer.  
Communism gave them shortages, but when it ended, conditions somehow became even worse. 
 Poll results from the early 1990s show that support for democratic capitalism in the 
Eastern Bloc varied depending on whom respondents blamed for the economic chaos.  Raymond 
Duch conducted a survey of the European USSR in 1990 and found that economic hardship did 
not inspire the Soviet people to instantly reject democracy and capitalism, because they still 
blamed the failing economy on communist rule.   Far more Soviets supported democratic and 
free market principles than authoritarian and communist ones.  The author also studied poll data 
from Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, which showed slightly different results.  As time 
passed and democratic capitalism became more established, people began to associate it with the 
continuing economic problems, although they were still not ready to abandon it.48 
Powers and Cox did a similar study based on Polish polling data from 1993.  They 
discovered that economic hardship did not necessarily drive Polish voters back towards 
communism.  Of greater importance was whether they considered the communist system or the 
first-wave of free market reformers responsible for the economy‟s problems the decline in living 
standards.  On a scale of 1 to 5, respondents assigned slightly higher blame to the communist 
system than the first-wave reformers, a mean of 3.1 for the former and 3.6 for the latter.  As 
shown in the chart below, the largest percentage believed that the reformers were mostly to 
blame and not the communist system.  However, the second largest number responded that both 
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deserved blame, and third largest considered communism mostly responsible.  Nevertheless, the 
most leftist party, Alliance of the Democratic Left, performed the best in the 1993 Polish 
election, and two of the next three runners-up also leaned towards the left.49 
Table 14. Relationship between Blame of the Communist System 
and Blame of First-Wave Reformers in Poland 
 
First-Wave Blame 
Low Medium High 
Communist system blame  
Low 6.0% 1.5% 34.3% 
Medium 1.0% 6.9% 3.0% 
High 18.5% 2.1% 26.8% 
Note: High blame = responses of 4 or 5; low blame of 1 or 2. 
Source: Powers and Cox, 619. 
According to a 1991 survey by the Pew Research Center, a majority of respondents in 
each of nine former Soviet bloc countries polled approved of the transition to democracy and 
capitalism.  However, the degree to which people accepted communism‟s demise varied greatly 
by country.  The Eastern bloc republics, which were nominally independent but actually 
controlled by Russia, had the largest majorities in favor of moving towards free markets and 
democracy.  These countries only became part of the Soviet sphere of influence after the Second 
World War and had communism forced upon them at that time.  As a result, they were not as 
accustomed or attached to the Soviet system and in fact tended to resent Russia‟s dominance 
over them.  This is evidenced by the intermittent worker rebellions in these countries and their 
rapid exits from the Bloc as soon as they realized Gorbachev would not use force to stop them.‡  
Ukrainians had also seen the worst of Soviet tyranny under Stalin and welcomed democracy as 
                                                                 
‡
 “The 40,000 aristocrats and fascists  of the Csepel Works strike on.” – A sarcastic poster from the Hungarian 
workers’ revolt of 1956 that i l lustrates the irony of official communist propaganda labeling dissatisfied members of 
the proletariat right-wing or bourgeois.  
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much or more than some of the Eastern Bloc nations.  As the leading ethnic group of the Soviet 
Union, Russians were the least unsatisfied with the existing political order, although a majority 
of 61 percent still favored democracy.  However, Russia and Ukraine, the most populous former 
Soviet republics, were both almost evenly split on whether they wanted capitalism.  Thus, it 
seems that Soviet citizens were frustrated with communism but unsure if capitalism was the right 
answer.50 
Table 15. Approval of Change to Democracy Table 16. Approval of Change to Capitalism 
 (in percent)  (in percent) 
Country 1991 2009 Change  Country 1991 2009 Change 
East Germany 91 85 -6  East Germany 86 82 -4 
Czech Republic 80 80 0  Czech Republic 87 79 -8 
Slovakia 70 71 +1  Poland 80 71 -9 
Poland 66 70 +4  Slovakia 69 66 -3 
Hungary 74 56 -18  Bulgaria 73 53 -20 
Lithuania 75 55 -20  Lithuania 76 50 -26 
Russia 61 53 -8  Russia 54 50 -4 
Bulgaria 76 52 -24  Hungary 80 46 -34 
Ukraine 72 30 -42  Ukraine 52 36 -16 
Source: Pew Research Center. 
Pew also conducted another survey asking the same questions in 2009, the results of 
which are likely to be the ones more surprising to Western readers.  East Germany, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, and Poland have held firm in their support for both capitalism and 
democracy.  However, Hungary, Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Ukraine have all seen significant drops 
in public support for the twin systems of liberal society in the last twenty years.  Opinions in the 
first three of these countries are split fairly evenly on whether the transition was desirable, while 
a large majority of Ukrainians now disapprove of the change on both accounts.  As for Russia, its 
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levels of support for liberal social systems were among the very bottom originally, but they have 
not fallen nearly as far as in the other countries in this second group.51   
These declines in support for liberalism come despite the fact that respondents in every 
country reported higher life satisfaction in 2009 than in 1991, often significantly so.  As one 
might expect, the countries with the lowest life satisfaction have large majorities that feel that 
people are worse off now than they were under communism.  However, the other seven countries 
polled also have significant pluralities that feel the same way.  Another interesting caveat to this 
data is that responses vary greatly by age group.  In every country but Ukraine, a majority of 
respondents ages 18-29 continue to favor democracy and capitalism, but this support consistently 
decreases as age increases.  Life satisfaction similarly decreases with age.52 
Table 17.  Percent Satisfied with Life        Table 18. People Worse Off Than  
        Under Communism? (in percent)  
Country 1991 2009 Change  Country Worse 
About 
the same 
Better 
Poland 12 44 +32  Hungary 72 16 8 
Slovakia 13 43 +30  Ukraine 62 13 12 
Russia 7 35 +28  Bulgaria 48 15 23 
Czech Republic 23 49 +26  Lithuania 48 15 23 
Lithuania 13 35 +22  Slovakia 48 18 29 
Ukraine 8 26 +18  Russia 45 15 33 
Bulgaria 7 15 +11  Czech Rep. 39 12 45 
Hungary 8 15 +7  Poland 35 12 47 
Germany 44 47 +3      
East 15 43 +28      
West 53 48 -4      
Source: Pew Research Center. 
According to interviews conducted by the author, the chaos and poverty of perestroika 
and inflation discredited democracy and capitalism in the eyes of many Russians.  Although the 
standard of living under communism was far lower under communism than in the West, 
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conditions were stable and virtually unchanging, so people grew accustomed to them.  Even in 
the 1980s, people in Russia lacked items which are considered essential in the West, such as 
telephones and toilet paper, yet none of the people interviewed reported feeling especially 
deprived.  Although the selection of food and goods was bland or inadequate, the necessary 
minimum was always available.  During the Gorbachev years, they heard that living standards 
were much better in the West and hoped that freeing the economy would bring the same to them.  
However, these hopes were soon met with disappointment.  In contrast to the communist days, 
perestroika and hyperinflation stood out in the interviewees‟ memories as catastrophic 
disturbances that made their lives worse than they had always been before.  In general, most 
Russians today do not want to go back to communism, but they do favor a state-guided 
economy.53 
  Despite some electoral irregularities, the presidencies of Vladimir Putin and his 
counterpart Dmitry Medvedev generally reflect the political preferences of Russia‟s citizens.  
After the shock therapy reforms and relatively free democratic competition of the 1990s, Putin 
has been gradually steering Russia away from both capitalism and democracy.  In an interview 
from 2006, Putin spoke about the need to additional state intervention in the economy, such as 
state investment, subsidies, price regulations, protectionist tariffs, etc.  While some of this 
rhetoric echoed the Soviet days, Putin and Medvedev‟s recent policies are more akin to state 
capitalism.  With allegations of voter fraud and poisoning of opposition leaders frequently in the 
news, Putin‟s lack of commitment to democracy is perhaps to well-known in the West to require 
much elaboration.  In short, Russia‟s legislature is very weak, the president is very powerful, and 
corruption is widespread.  An international rating agency, Freedom House, has downgraded 
Russia‟s score on civil and political rights continuously since 1997.54 
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Opposition to Putin is relatively weak and not entirely committed to democracy and 
capitalism either.  Since the Soviet Union fell, the largest opposition party in Russia has been the 
reformed Communist Party, but it has never been able to regain power through the ballot box.  
Numerous other opposition parties have formed over the past twenty years, but none have had 
any considerable electoral success.  Most of these parties have been based around particular 
leaders, which has made it easier for those in power to deal with political threats as individuals, 
rather than institutions.  Some of these parties have merged with Putin‟s party, United Russia, 
while others have faded from significance. The only other party which has consistently remained 
a somewhat of a force in post-Soviet Russia is the misnamed Liberal Democratic Party of 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky.  More accurately, Zhirinovsky‟s views can be described as far-right, 
nationalist, racist, or imperialist.  If there were any danger of the Russian hyperinflation leading 
to a similar result as in the Weimar Republic, it would be with Zhirinovsky.  However, his party 
hit a peak with 22.8 percent in the 1993 Duma elections and has been unable to improve its 
results since.55 
Table 19. Russian Presidential Elections, 2000-2012 
 2000 2004 2008 2012 
United Russia 
(Putin/Medvedev) 
53.4 71.3 71.2 63.6 
Communist Party 
(Zyuganov/Kharitonov) 
29.5 13.7 18 17.2 
Liberal Democratic 
(Zhirinovsky/Malyshkin) 
2.7 2.0 9.5 6.2 
Others 14.4 13 1.3 11.79 
Source: Åslund, 208, 245. 
Most Russians have shown no interest in experimenting with any new ideologies and 
seen content to elect establishment-picked successors.  Although Boris Yeltsin had become very 
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unpopular by the late 1990s, his chosen heir, Putin, has been in power ever since.  When Putin 
switched offices with Medvedev to appease constitutional technicality, Russian voters went 
along with the façade.  After months of intrigue of whether Medvedev or Putin would run in 
2012, Putin rather unsurprisingly became President again.  His winning percentage fell to 63.6 
percent, down from a peak of 71.3 percent in 2004, but still much higher than his total of 53.4 
percent from the year 2000.  More importantly, Putin‟s share of the vote in 2012 was over three 
times higher than his closest opponent from the Communist Party, and the other candidates were 
mired in the single digits.  Thus, even if there is some degree of voter fraud in Russia, it appears 
that a genuine majority of Russians is willing to follow Putin down the road to moderate 
authoritarianism.56 
Conclusion 
Partly due to the trauma of perestroika and hyperinflation, many people in former 
communist countries have come to view the transition to democracy and capitalism unfavorably.  
However, when the transition was in progress, larger majorities saw it as necessary.  Consumers 
had grown tired of constant shortages of most goods and hoped that capitalism and democracy 
would improve their lives. Instead, the economy got worse under Gorbachev, as his reforms 
failed to increase productivity or supply of consumer goods, but did increase budget deficits.  
When the Soviet Union completely collapse and Russia moved ahead with full-fledged 
democracy and capitalist shock therapy, the first result was hyperinflation.  The collapse of the 
ruble benefitted only a small number of well-connected or corrupt “new Russians,” while the rest 
of the population suffered.  Shortages actually became worse initially, life savings and monthly 
pensions became worthless, and the quality of diets drastically declined.  These traumatic 
experiences have tempered the enthusiasm of many for capitalism and democracy, especially the 
90 
 
elderly, who suffered more than most.  In many former communist countries, citizens have been 
willing to accept a return to authoritarianism in both politics and economics for the sake of 
stability and some insurance of material comfort.57 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Since the inception of the Soviet Union until its collapse and beyond, inflation and price 
controls have influenced Russian living standards and politics.  Inflation and food shortages 
helped bring down the Russian imperial and provisional governments, which paved the way for 
the Bolsheviks.  However, the first few years of Bolshevik rule led to hyperinflation, outright 
famine, and growing rebellions.  In order to consolidate their political power, the Bolsheviks 
realized that they needed to control inflation.  They successfully stabilized the ruble in the 1920s 
with conventional fiscal conservatism, but inflation began to rise again after Stalin took over and 
the economy was collectivized. Stalin instituted a widespread system of price controls that lasted 
until the end of the Soviet period.  After grappling with inflation before and during the Second 
World War, the Soviet government managed to stop growing prices with a currency reform in 
1947. 
 In the post-war era, Soviet planners effectively managed to keep prices under control.  
However, inflationary pressure could not be completely eliminated by simply fixing prices.  
After the 1960s, workers‟ wages continued to grow faster than the prices of goods.  In a market 
economy, prices act as a signal to tell producers what to produce and how much.  In the Soviet 
economy, planners decided what to produce and how much it should cost.  Since they never 
adequately increased either the prices or the supply of food and consumer goods, the result was 
constant shortages.  Shortages lasted as long as the Soviet Union did and created very low living 
standards in comparison to the West.  Incomes continued to fall further behind, while many food 
products and goods that were ubiquitous in the West were almost unavailable in the Soviet 
Union. 
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 Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet leader, hoped to solve the problems that had been 
plaguing the Soviet economy for decades, but instead, his efforts made the existing problems 
worse and created new ones.  Gorbachev‟s reforms, known as perestroika, allowed just enough 
freedom to initiate the collapse of the Soviet command system, but not enough to create a 
functioning market economy. The constituent parts of the Soviet Union ceased to function 
together as a unit and started taking short-sighted actions to try to help themselves which actually 
hurt the entire economy.  In addition, the government started running large budget deficits under 
Gorbachev and paying for them by simply printing money.  In short, Gorbachev‟s policies led to 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, even greater shortages, and Russia‟s second hyperinflation.  
However, the hyperinflation started when prices were freed, just after the Soviet Union ended, so 
many people associated the chaos of the 1990s with free markets and democracy.  As a result, 
most Russians today are skeptical of full-fledged capitalism and believe that a state-guided 
economy is necessary to ensure stability. 
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